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ABSTRACT





Education and infrastructure are two important development strategies in low-income
countries. They foster economic growth by improving labor productivity and facili-
tating market integration. Evaluating them poses a considerable challenge because
schooling choices and infrastructure constructions are influenced by unobserved char-
acteristics that bias OLS estimates. This dissertation uses appropriate natural ex-
periment and instrumental variable strategies to study the e↵ect of skilled emigration
prospects on human capital investment, identify inter-sibling spillovers in education,
and evaluate the impact of proximity to road on farm profits.
Chapter 1 focuses on a natural experiment that involves the recruitment of Nepali
men of Gurkha ethnicity into the British Army to identify whether improved prospects
for skilled emigration may stimulate human capital investment at home. While the
recruitment originated during the British colonial rule in South Asia, a change in the
education requirement for Nepali recruits in 1993 resulted in an exogenous, di↵erential
increase in their skilled versus unskilled emigration prospects. I use individual-level
information on ethnicity, gender, and age to estimate positive e↵ects on school at-
x
tainment of Gurkha men. I extend this analysis in chapter 2 to study its impact on
education of Gurkha women and estimate the net trade-o↵s between siblings’ human
capital investments. While I find that eligible men responded to the rule change by
raising their schooling by over one year, a 30 % increase over their average, part of
the improvements in their education came at the expense of their female counterparts
living in the same household, whose education decreased by 0.11 years.
In chapter 3, I estimate the benefits of having easier access to road on farm profits.
I overcome endogenous selection in road placement by constructing an instrument
based on a geographic feature. Because mountains in Nepal stretch in a north-south
direction, the cheaper cost of constructing a north-south road relative to an east-west
road to connect the district headquarters led to greater access for villages in north-
south hinterlands relative to those in east-west hinterlands. I find that farmlands




Human Capital Investment Responses to Skilled
Migration Prospects: Evidence from a Natural
Experiment in Nepal
1.1 Introduction
“Brain drain” describes the emigration of skilled workers, mainly from developing
to developed countries. It hinders countries’ long-run economic growth by depleting
their scarce human capital. In 2000 more than 12 million individuals from developing
countries with tertiary education, 20 percent of their educated workforce, were living
in OECD countries.
A new literature in skilled emigration emphasizes the e↵ect of future emigration
opportunities on human capital accumulation. The reasoning behind these “brain
gain” models is that migration prospects raise the expected returns to education and
encourage individuals at home to increase their human capital investment. If enough
skilled individuals eventually decide not to emigrate, it can lead to a net increase
in human capital stock at home.1 While these new theoretical predictions challenge
1Individuals could change their emigration decision in the future for various reasons. The most
popular explanation put forward by earlier brain gain papers is that quotas set by immigration
authorities in destination countries are binding. Hence, even if lots of individuals actively seek
to emigrate in the future, most of them are forced to live in their home country. Other reasons
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the negative view of skilled emigration, empirical evidence is scarce because migration
prospects are endogenous. This paper overcomes the problem by identifying a natural
experiment that exogenously and di↵erentially raised emigration prospects for skilled
versus unskilled individuals at home.
The experiment involves a change in the British Gurkha Army recruitment reg-
ulations. The British Gurkha Army is the unit of the British Armed Forces that is
composed of Nepali men of Monglo-Tibeto origins. According to Banskota (1994),
since 1857 the Monglo-Tibeto tribes have created a tradition of enlisting in the British
Gurkha Army, and thereby they are collectively referred to as the Gurkha ethnic
group.2 Furthermore, the economic and anthropological data from Nepal indicate
that this British colonial tradition still plays an important financial and cultural role
in the Gurkha communities of Nepal.3 In 1993 the British government changed the
educational requirement for the British Gurkha applicants, from requiring no edu-
cation to requiring a minimum of 8th grade education. This change was instigated
by the modernization of the British Army following the developments in Eastern Eu-
rope in the early 1990s and the growing use of technology in warfare, as indicated
by discussions in the House of Commons.4 The reform focused on reducing service
manpower and increasing technological capabilities, which were complemented by
improving training and education of soldiers. Because this change was part of the
broader restructuring of the British Army, the timing and the rationale for this change
is exogenous to social, economic, or political characteristics of Nepal. Therefore, it
why individuals change their emigration decision, include unanticipated future changes in individ-
uals’ socio-economic characteristics as well as changes in their preferences which a↵ect their future
emigration choices.
2All the remaining ethnicities in Nepal, excluding the Gurkha ethnic group, are referred to as
the “non-Gurkha” ethnic group for the remainder of this paper.
3For detailed documentation for the cultural significance and the financial contribution of the
British Gurkha among Gurkha communities of Nepal, see Hitchcock (1966); Caplan (1995).
4For detailed documentation of the strategic defense reviews presented to the House of Com-
mons regarding the restructuring of the British Army in early 1990s, together with the debate and
discussions that followed, see the Eighth Defense Review. http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
o ce.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmdfence/138/13802.htm
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provides a simple natural experiment where Gurkha men experienced an exogenous
increase in skilled emigration prospect relative to unskilled emigration to a foreign
labor market i.e. the British Army.
My empirical approach improves identification compared to the strategies used
in previous studies. The problem in estimating the impact of skilled emigration
prospects on education arises for two reasons: first, unobserved characteristics, such
as cultural norms and values, a↵ect both migration and schooling decisions; and
second, an increase in human capital raises migration incentives by reducing the
domestic wage for skilled workers. Beine et al. (2006) address this problem by in-
strumenting current migration prospects with the past emigrant stock. But the same
time-invariant characteristics that a↵ect migration prospects and necessitate the use
of an instrumental variable strategy are also likely to have a↵ected migration in the
past, thus undermining the validity of their historical instrument. While McKen-
zie and Rapoport (2006) argue that historical migration rates within Mexico are the
outcome of early 20th century railroad networks, it could still be problematic if past
migration led to a better assimilation of foreign ideas, such as value of education,
or if individuals with similar characteristics came to live together in regions with
better access to railroads. Therefore, the ideal experiment would require two groups
of individuals from developing countries that are identical except that skilled emi-
gration prospects exogenously increase for one of them.5 The change in education
requirement of the British Gurkha Army created such an experiment.
Using Nepal Census data from 2001, I identify individuals’ ethnicity to determine
whether they were a↵ected by this rule change. Since age-invariant ethnic characteris-
5To my knowledge, the only previous study to use a historical event for identification is Chand and
Clemens (2008). They use the unexpected coup in Fiji as a source of variation to study the e↵ect of
emigration prospects on education. However, in contrast to my experiment, emigration prospects for
the treatment group did not change exogenously but instead they argue that the decline in economic
opportunity at home due to political instability created greater incentive for them to emigrate. In
response, they invested in education that increased their likelihood of successfully emigrating to
countries such as Australia.
3
tics could a↵ect education, I use their age at the time of the rule change as the second
criteria to determine their exposure. Given the recruits must be between the age of
171
2
and 21 years old, only men who were 21 or younger in 1993 could be a↵ected by
the rule change. I refer to these cohorts as the “eligible” cohort and older cohorts
as the “ineligible” cohort in this paper. The di↵erence-in-di↵erence strategy controls
for all age-varying characteristics and age-invariant ethnic characteristics that could
be correlated with education. As an alternative strategy, I use the synthetic control
method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) by constructing a comparison
for the Gurkha ethnic group based on ineligible cohorts’ ethnic characteristics. The
results suggest that the change in the educational requirement induced Gurkha men
of cohorts aged 6 to 12 at the time of the rule change to raise their education by 1.11
years and cohorts aged 13 to 21 by 0.39 years. The estimates are consistent across
the two strategies, highlighting the robustness of my empirical findings. More impor-
tantly, the rule change did not increase migration rates of eligible Gurkha men and
increase in schooling also occurred for eligible Gurkha men who had not emigrated
by 2001, which means that the rule change increased the net human capital stock of
eligible Gurkha men.
My findings show that skilled emigration can lead to a net increase in human capi-
tal at home, by highlighting a positive impact of migration prospects on human capital
investment. The early literature in skilled emigration ignore this relationship and fo-
cus solely on the loss of human capital from emigration of skilled workers, thereby
concluding that skilled emigration is detrimental to home country’s human capital
accumulation.6 By assuming that productivity increases with greater concentration
of skilled workers, the endogenous growth models of Miyagiwa (1991) and Haque and
Kim (1995) also predict negative impacts on economic growth. However, Mountford
(1997) and Stark et al. (1997) show that endogenizing human capital accumulation
6Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) propose the brain drain tax to compensate for the loss incurred
by developing countries due to skilled emigration.
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on migration prospects, could raise net human capital stock of low income countries
and improve their economic growth if some skilled individuals eventually decide not
to emigrate. Since the recruitment was limited to 300 individuals annually, majority
of eligible Gurkha men did not join the British Gurkha Army. Therefore, my findings
are consistent with the theoretical predictions and overturn the pessimistic outcomes
of the earlier models.
While Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) and Kochar (2004) show that schooling
choices are a↵ected by educational returns at home, my paper extends their anal-
ysis beyond political boundaries into foreign labor markets. I develop a theoretical
model of human capital and emigration decisions, highlighting the three important
factors that drive my results. First, there is a significant increase in income through
emigration; second, there is an educational requirement to emigrate; and third, the
likelihood of successfully emigrating is low. These three factors, which propelled el-
igible Gurkha men to invest in education and led to a net increase in their human
capital following the rule change, are also the main drivers of brain gain in other
developing countries. Beine et al. (2006) argue that large income di↵erences between
developing and developed countries increase the perceived benefits of migration, and
induce emigration in developing countries. According to Docquier et al. (2007), popu-
lar destination countries such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the EU
employ skill-biased immigration policy, thereby making skilled emigration the most
feasible way for individuals from developing countries to emigrate. They also find
that the skilled emigration rate in developing countries in 2000 was only 7%, despite
an increase of 70% over the previous decade. In line with my findings, Chand and
Clemens (2008) show that skill-selective points systems used by immigration author-
ities of Australia and New Zealand induced Fijians to invest in education, resulting
in a net increase in the human capital stock of Fiji. Therefore, the underlying mecha-
nisms of my unique natural experiment are consistent with economic forces a↵ecting
5
individuals’ education and migration choices in many developing countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the natural
experiment. Section 3 presents a theoretical framework that forms the basis of brain
gain models. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy and the data used for causal
estimation. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 presents robustness
for the identification strategy and Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Background
Nepal is a landlocked country surrounded by India on three sides and China to
its north. Its geographical position historically made it a melting ground for people
and cultures from both north and south of its border (Shrestha, 2001b). The 1996
National Living Standard Survey categorizes the population of Nepal into 15 ethnic
groups. Out of them, the Gurkha ethnic group is comprised of 5 Monglo-Tibeto tribal
groups– the Rai, Limbu, Gurung, Magar, and Tamang, who settled in the eastern
and central hills of Nepal during the initial wave of migration from the north.
1.2.1 British Brigade of Gurkha
The British Brigade of Gurkha is the unit in the British Army that is composed
of Nepali soldiers. Following the Anglo-Gurkha war (1814-1816), the British East
India company and the Government of Nepal signed the treaty of Sugauli on March
4, 1816. The treaty transferred one-third of the territories previously held by Nepal
to the British and allowed them to set up three Gurkha regiments in the British
Indian Army.7 The early recruits of the British Gurkha Army included ethnic groups
such as the Rajput, Thakuri, Chetri, and Brahman, who migrated from the south
and were closely associated with the ethnicities of India. In 1857, Indian soldiers
serving in the British Indian Army led a mutiny against British rule in South Asia.
7For details of the Sugauli Treaty see Rathaur (2001).
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Although the rebellion was eventually contained in 1858, the British became wary
of Indian nationals serving in their army. Rathaur (2001) and Caplan (1995) argue
that, as a result, the British stopped recruiting Nepali individuals belonging to the
ethnicities that originated from India into the British Gurkha Army. According to
Rathaur (2001) after 1857, the new Nepali recruits were mainly drawn from the Rai,
Limbu, Gurung, Magar, and Tamang ethnic groups who, unlike other ethnicities in
Nepal, had migrated from north and had no cultural or historical ties with India.8
This ethnicity bias in the recruitment of British Gurkha Army continues to exist to
the present day as the majority of the current British Gurkha soldiers are comprised
of these 5 Monglo-Tibeto tribes. Although the British government no longer uses
ethnicity as a criteria for selection, the de facto ethnicity bias could be due to the lack
of information on recruitment available for non-Gurkhas, or because non-Gurkhas are
marginalized in the recruitment process as the first stage of selection is conducted by
ex-Gurkha servicemen who are themselves from Gurkha ethnic group. Consequently,
this British colonial tradition has evolved into an important cultural identity and
lucrative economic opportunity for the individuals of the Gurkha ethnic group. The
present value of the lifetime income from serving in the British Gurkha Army for
25 years is estimated to be $ 1,334,091.81.9 This includes a starting salary of $
21,000 and a lifelong annual pension of about $ 15,000 after retirement. According to
Caplan (1995), remittances from Gurkha soldiers and pensions for ex-Gurkha soldiers
were the country’s largest earner of foreign currency until the recent development of
tourism and other sources of migration. Although every year there are only 300
successful applicants, the pay and pensions of the servicemen are the major source
8The preference for Gurkha ethnic men is evident from the letter by the British Commanding
Recruitment O cer to Colonel Berkely, the British Resident at Kathmandu, in the early 1900s in
which he writes, “I first consider his caste. If he is of the right caste, though his physique is weak, I
take him” (Banskota, 1994).
9See Table 1.10 for estimation of the lifetime income for Gurkha soldiers. Other non-financial
benefits include the opportunity to permanently settle in the UK along with immediate family
members.
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of capital in most Monglo-Tibeto communities in the hills of Nepal, mainly because
their alternative employment is limited to farming.10 The financial benefits of the
British Gurkha Army in these communities is evident from quotes from the Gurkha
households documented by Caplan (1995) such as, “One of my boys has gone to the
Army, we have only that hope.”
Although the appeal of joining the British Gurkha Army is driven by economic
benefits, it also brings cultural prestige to Gurkha communities. Caplan (1995) points
out that Gurkha ex-servicemen as well as their wives are known in their villages by
their titles of the British Army and acquire considerable reputations to become the
new elite in their communities. Hitchcock (1966) reports that many Gurkha villages
are named after the title of their highest ranking British Gurkha o cer, such as
“the Captain’s village.” These narratives highlight the social, political, and economic
stature wielded by the British Gurkha Army in Gurkha communities of Nepal.
1.2.2 Natural Experiment: A Change in Education Criteria
Education is an important aspect of the British Gurkha recruitment. Starting
from 1993, recruits must have completed at least 8 years of education.11 Prior to this,
however, no formal education was required to join the British Army and the selection
criteria was strictly limited to physical examinations. This change in the education
requirement was instigated by the larger restructuring of the British Army in the early
1990s. Following the end of the cold war, a series of defense reviews termed “Option
for Change” was conducted by the UK Ministry of Defense in order to evaluate the
role of its army in the post-cold war era. It focused on reducing defense expenditure
spurred by the economic benefits of the “peace dividend”12 and, consequently, led to
10The Defense Committee of the House of Commons in 1989 suggested that the annual salary of
British Gurkha soldier was 100 times the average income in the hills from where they come from.
11In 1997, the education requirement was further increased to a minimum of 10 years of education.
12Peace dividend is a political slogan popularized by US president George H.W. Bush and UK
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher after the end of the cold war. It describes the reduction in
defense spending undertaken by many western nations, including as the US and the UK, and the
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a reduction in service manpower of the British Army by 18 percent. Furthermore, this
reduction was accompanied by the emphasis on a flexible and modernized force. This
was achieved by incorporating new technologies in weapon systems, communications,
reconnaissance missions, and intelligence gathering, and by improving education and
training of soldiers. The Option for Change outlined the use of technology in future
warfare and the importance of education for soldiers who use it, and concluded that
“strong defense requires military capability of fighting in a high-technology warfare;
the aim is smaller forces, better equipped, and properly trained” (Eighth Defense
Report, 1997). In fact, the trend towards educated soldiers had already begun in the
US Army, as its recruits with a high school diploma increased by 30 percent in the
late 1980s.13 Hence, the increase in educational requirement for the British Gurkha
was induced by the modernization of the British Army in response to the increasing
role of technology and the political changes in Eastern Europe and, therefore, it was
exogenous to the socio-political events in Nepal.
1.3 Theoretical Model
Becker’s model of human capital views education as an investment, where indi-
viduals compare their costs to future benefits. The future benefits from investing
in education is an increase in lifetime income earned domestically when there is no
opportunity to emigrate. Given positive emigration prospects, however, the future
benefits should additionally include expected increase in income earned abroad. Fur-
thermore, the latter could be larger if either the wage rate per human capital is
higher abroad, or income abroad at all levels of education is greater and education
is required to emigrate, or both. The following theoretical model, based on Docquier
subsequent redirection of those resources into social programs and a decrease in tax rates.
13According to the Tenth Quadrennial Review of US Military Compensation, the recruits who
scored better than the median in the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) increased by 10% in
early 1990s.
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et al. (2007), highlights these positive e↵ects of higher skilled emigration prospects
on expected returns to schooling and, consequently, on educational investment and
net human capital stock.
Consider a small developing economy, where labor is an important factor of pro-
duction and is measured in e ciency units. All individuals at birth are endowed
with a unit of e ciency. They live for two periods, youth and adulthood. There is
an education program which if opted into during youth, increases the individual’s
e ciency in adulthood to h > 1. Furthermore, the heterogeneity among individu-
als is highlighted by the di↵erences in their cost of the education program, denoted
by c, which has a cumulative distribution F (c) and density function f(c) defined on
R+. Suppose the domestic economy is perfectly competitive so that workers are paid
their marginal product, denoted by w. In youth, uneducated workers earn w and
educated workers earn w   c. In adulthood, individuals can choose to work abroad,
where the wage rate per e ciency unit is ŵ > w and the income premium is I >
0. In adulthood, uneducated workers can either earn ŵ + I if they migrate or w if
they don’t. Likewise, educated workers can earn ŵh + I if they migrate and wh if
they don’t migrate. Individuals incur a fixed cost in adulthood if they attempt to
emigrate, denoted by M . Let the probability of migration, denoted by p, be the same
for both educated and uneducated workers. Suppose (ŵ+ I w)   M
p
, which implies
that all individuals would choose to emigrate.14
If individuals are risk neutral so that they choose their education to maximize
14The condition for all educated workers to choose to migrate is ŵh + I   wh   Mp and for
uneducated worker, it is ŵ+ I  w   Mp . These conditions imply that an increase in income due to
migration should be greater or equal to the ratio of the cost and probability of migration. According
to the UK Defense Committee, the annual salary of a British Gurkha soldier in 1989 was 100 times
the average income in Nepal. Furthermore, the financial cost of applying for the British Gurkha is
minimal as there is no application fee and the recruiters visit most Gurkha villages every year during
the first stage of selection process. Moreover, the empirical estimate is interpreted as the average
treatment e↵ect on all age eligible Gurkha men, regardless of their future intention of applying to
the British Gurkha.
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lifetime income, then the condition for investing in education becomes:
w   c + (1  p) wh + p (ŵh+ I)  M > w + (1  p) w + p (ŵ + I)  M
and individuals will invest in education if and only if:
c < c
p
⌘ w(h  1) + p (ŵ   w) (h  1) (1.1)
The critical threshold c
p
is increasing in the probability of migration p, which
implies that migration prospects raise the expected return to education and induce
more individuals in developing countries to invest in education. Furthermore, this
incentive e↵ect is larger, greater the international wage di↵erence (ŵ   w). The






Now, suppose the migration probability changes di↵erentially across educated
and uneducated workers.15 In line with the change in the British Gurkha education
requirement, the migration probability is assumed to be still p for educated workers
but p for unskilled workers, where p equals zero. The probability p is assumed to be
exogenously determined by the service requirement of the British Army independent
of schooling decisions of individuals at home.16 Uneducated workers remain at home
and therefore earn domestic wage w in both periods. In contrast, educated workers
earn w   c in their youth and once adult they can earn either ŵh + I   M if they
15Prior to the rule change in 1993, both educated and uneducated workers had equal probability
of joining the British Gurkha Army. Furthermore, since the selection criteria were solely based
on physical attributes, education did not increase one’s chance of getting selected. Following the
rule change in 1993, however, only individuals with required education level could apply; whereas,
individuals with less than 8 years of education could no longer apply to the British Gurkha.
16The probability p can be a decreasing function of cs(p) in (2), defining an implicit solution for
p. The response to the rule change is partly determined by individual’s expectation of how others
would response to the rule change, which in turn a↵ect their perceived p. The perceived and actual
probability after the rule change will either stay the same or increase.
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migrate or wh M if they don’t.17 The new condition for investing in education is:
w   c + (1  p) wh + p (ŵh+ I)  M > w + w
and individuals will opt for education if and only if:
c < c
s
⌘ w(h  1) + p (ŵ   w) h + p I  M (1.2)
The new critical threshold c
s
is increasing in skilled emigration probability p, the







because individuals who could emigrate without education previously, are
now prompted to invest in education in order to earn income premium abroad. To sum
up, emigration prospects raise expected returns to education because of higher wage
rate abroad, and skilled emigration relative to unskilled emigration prospects further
increase expected returns to education because only skilled workers can emigrate and
earn the higher income premium.
After pF (C
s
) fraction of workers migrate abroad in their adulthood, the share of
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if and only if:
p < ep ⌘ F (Cs)   F (Cp)
F (C
s




ep < 1 denotes the critical threshold probability of emigration for which the incen-
tive e↵ect of brain gain exceeds the negative e↵ect of brain drain. Given an extremely
17Similar to the previous case, assume ŵh + I   wh   Mp , so that all educated workers would
choose to migrate.
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low likelihood of getting selected into the British Gurkha Army, the probability of
skilled emigration through the Gurkha recruitment is likely to be below ep, suggesting
that the rule change would create a net gain in human capital.
1.4 Identification Strategy
The change in the educational requirement in 1993 compelled new recruits to com-
plete at least 8 years of education in order to be eligible for the British Gurkha and,
thereby, increased their skilled emigration prospect relative to unskilled emigration.
The theoretical analysis above suggests that this rule change would increase expected
returns to education and induce individuals to invest in human capital. Furthermore,
because the rule change was exogenous to the socio-economic characteristics of Nepal,
the empirical strategy of comparing the education outcome of individuals who were
a↵ected to those who were not a↵ected by the rule change gives an unbiased estimate
of its e↵ect on domestic schooling.
The individuals’ exposure is jointly determined by their sex, ethnicity, and age.
First, the British Gurkha, in contrast to the other regiments of the British Army,
is exclusively made up of men; therefore, women were not a↵ected. Second, because
recruits must be between 171
2
and 21 years old, men who were 22 or older in 1993 were
not a↵ected by the rule change.18 Third, considering most British Gurkha soldiers
since 1857 have been Gurkha ethnic men, non-Gurkha men were also not a↵ected.
Hence, the e↵ect of rule change on age eligible Gurkha ethnic men is identified via
di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimation, comparing male education between eligible and
ineligible cohorts, within Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic groups. The di↵erence in
education between the two cohorts in the Gurkha ethnic group could be correlated
with the age-varying unobserved variables. Therefore, subtracting from this the co-
18As mentioned earlier, cohorts 22 and older are referred to as the “ineligible” cohort and cohorts
21 and younger are referred to as the “eligible” cohort.
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hort di↵erence in education for non-Gurkha ethnic men would net out all age-varying
characteristics as well as age-invariant ethnic characteristics that could directly a↵ect
education. The identification assumption is that in absence of this rule change in
1993, the evolution of education outcomes of men between the two cohorts would not
have systematically di↵ered across Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic groups. Further-
more, the di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimate of female education between the two ethnic
groups and cohorts serves as a false experiment to test this identification assumption.



































is the education outcome for individual i of age k and ethnicity m, born
in district l; ↵
1k
is an age dummy for each k;  
1m
is an ethnicity dummy for each
m; ⌘
1l
is a district of birth dummy for each l; G
im
is a dummy indicating whether
individual belongs to the Gurkha ethnic group; T
ik
is a dummy indicating whether the
individual belongs to eligible cohort; P
ij
is a dummy indicating whether individual is
age j for j 2 {age cohorts}; R
m
is a vector of ethnicity-specific variables; and K
l
is
a vector of district-specific variables.
The above reduced form specification nets out any positive or negative external-
ities that a↵ect both Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic groups. On one hand, higher
school enrollment among age eligible Gurkha men could decrease quality of education,
which in turn could negatively impact schooling. On the other hand, higher school
enrollment could create positive peer e↵ects, encouraging schooling among Gurkha
and non-Gurkha ethnic men who have no intention of joining the British Gurkha.
Hence, the coe cient from the above specification should be interpreted as the net
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e↵ect of the rule change on age eligible Gurkha ethnic men.19 Furthermore, since the
information regarding individual’s decision to apply for the British Gurkha are not
available, the coe cient is also the average treatment e↵ect from the rule change on
all age eligible Gurkha men, regardless of their future intention of applying for the
British Gurkha.
The identification strategy can also be generalized to examine the impact of the
rule change for each birth-year cohort in the following regression framework:
Y
iklm




































can be interpreted as the e↵ect of the rule change on Gurkha men of age
x. Since men who were 22 and older were not a↵ected, the coe cients  
x
should be 0
for x   22. Additionally, the coe cients  
x
should increase as x decreases for x < 22.
Younger age eligible Gurkha men were more likely to be enrolled in school at the time
of the rule change and had more time to complete 8th grade education, putting them
in a better position to respond to the rule change compared to older age eligible men.
The data required for the above identification strategy are obtained from 2001
Nepal Census for individuals aged 6 to 44 in 1993. It also includes information for
individuals who were living abroad in 2001, abating the concern for potential bias
due to selective attrition.20 The census data are supplemented with Nepal Living
Standard Survey (NLSS) from 1996, which is a household sample survey with greater
19Given Figure 1.1 suggests that Gurkha ethnic group is concentrated in specific regions of Nepal,
the externalities generated by the response to the rule change is also more likely to be experienced
by Gurkhas rather than non-Gurkhas. In this case, the estimated e↵ect of the rule change should
be interpreted as an overall e↵ect on eligible Gurkha men, with a combination of the net e↵ect of
the rule change and net externality among Gurkhas generated by the rule change.
20If the entire household moved abroad between 1993 and 2001, then the information on those
individuals are not available. However, the propensity for the entire household to move abroad is
extremely low in Nepal.
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detail. Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the 1,389,705 individuals from the
2001 Census and the 3,373 households from the 1996 NLSS. The averages for some
socio-economic characteristics are provided for the entire sample as well as separately
for the Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic groups. The Gurkha ethnic group comprises
of 16 percent of the samples in both surveys. Panel A shows that the average level
of education for the Gurkha ethnic group is 3.28, which is slightly lower than the
non-Gurkha average of 4.24. Similarly, 18.2% of Gurkha individuals were born in
urban districts compared to 34.1% of non-Gurkhas. Panel B suggests that around the
time of the rule change, non-Gurkha households had better access to school facilities
than Gurkha households and 46.9% of non-Gurkha households were living in poverty
compared to 48.5% of Gurkha households. Figure 1.1 shows the map of Nepal with
the distribution of Gurkha ethnic group across 75 regional districts. It suggests that
most Gurkha households live in the northern central region and north east corner of
Nepal and predictably, the three British Gurkha recruitment centers are also located
within these regions.
1.5 Results
The identification strategy can be illustrated with a simple di↵erence-in-di↵erence
table between the eligible and ineligible cohorts in the Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic
groups. Table 1.2 compares educational attainment of Gurkha and non-Gurkha men
who were not a↵ected by the rule change (age 22 - 28) to those who were a↵ected,
either cohort aged 6 to 12 or cohort aged 13 to 21. I use eligible cohort aged 6 to 12
as the preferred cohort of analysis because this younger eligible cohort is most likely
to be enrolled in primary school in 1993 and also have enough time to change their
education in line with the new rule by the time they apply to the British Gurkha.
On the contrary, the ability of older eligible men aged 13 to 21 to respond to the rule
change is determined by the years of education that they have had completed in 1993.
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For example, a Gurkha men of age 20 would only be able to successfully respond to
the rule change, if he had at least 7 years of education in 1993. Given the data on
their education in 1993 are not available, the older eligible cohort includes Gurkha
men some of whom were a↵ected by the rule change and others who were not.
In both ethnic groups, average education increased over time; but it increased
more in the Gurkha ethnic group. The simple di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimation
shows that Gurkha men of younger eligible cohort (aged 6-12) completed an average
of 1.2 more years of education. This is significantly di↵erence from zero at the 1%
level. Panel B shows that Gurkha men of older eligible cohort (aged 13-21) also
raised their education by 0.28 years, which is less compared to younger eligible cohort
but also expected due to the reasons discussed earlier. The two estimates are large
in magnitude especially for younger eligible cohort with an increase in education of
32% over the ineligible cohort. The positive impact of the rule change indicates that
the British Gurkha constitutes an attractive foreign labor market opportunity for
Gurkha men. Furthermore, it highlights the role of skilled emigration prospects on
increasing returns to education among individuals who might otherwise have limited
opportunity to benefit from education in the domestic labor market. This is especially
true for Gurkha recruitment as Caplan (1995) notes that most of the potential recruits
come from rural villages of Nepal and if not for the British Gurkha Army their best
alternative source of income is farming.
Tables 1.3 present the di↵erence-in-di↵erence analysis by estimating coe cient
  in equation (1.4). The specification in column 1 controls for age dummies and
ethnicity dummies and the specification in column 2 additionally controls for district
of birth dummies. Figure 1.1 shows that Gurkha ethnic groups are concentrated in
the northern central region and north east corner of Nepal. If time-varying regional
characteristics are correlated with education, it could bias the above estimates. I
control for di↵erential evolution of geographic regions in columns 3, 4, and 5 by
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including interactions of age dummies and district of birth dummies, for all ages
and districts. The specification in columns 4 and 5 also include interactions of age
dummies and district-level characteristics– total number of primary and secondary
teachers in 1994. Moreover, the specification in column 5 controls for additional
time-varying ethnic characteristic by including the interaction of age dummies and
ethnicity-level variable measuring the travel time to school, obtained from 1996 NLSS.
The errors in all specifications are clustered at the ethnicity level.
The estimates in Table 1.3, column 1 suggest that an increase in educational
requirement for the British Gurkha raised the education among younger eligible co-
hort by 1.19 years and older eligible cohort by 0.42 years, and both estimates are
statistically significant at the 1% level. More importantly, controlling for various
time-varying regional and ethnic characteristics do not change the magnitude and
the statistical significance of the estimates for both eligible cohorts, which makes it
unlikely that the results are driven by time-varying characteristics that are correlated
with education. The estimates in column 5, which includes all the controls mentioned
earlier, suggest that Gurkha men from younger eligible cohort raised their education
by 1.11 years and older eligible cohort by 0.39 years.
The above results rely on the assumption that in absence of the rule change,
the di↵erence of educational outcomes between the eligible and ineligible cohorts
would not have systematically di↵ered across Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic groups.
Table 1.4 presents a series of control experiments that compare educational attain-
ment between cohorts and ethnic groups that were not a↵ected by the rule change
and therefore, in contrast to the results in Table 1.3, should produce di↵erence-in-
di↵erence estimates of zero. Panel A compares education of ineligible cohort aged 22
to 28 with another ineligible cohort aged 29 to 35 across Gurkha and non-Gurkha
men. The estimate of coe cient   in column 5 is 0.01 and not statistically di↵erent
from zero at the conventional levels. The control experiment in panel B considers
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cohort aged 22 to 28 and cohort aged 38 to 44, so that the age di↵erence between the
two ineligible cohorts is consistent with the experiment in panel A of Table 1.2, in
which the age di↵erence between the younger eligible cohort and ineligible cohort is 9
years. The estimates are also not statistically di↵erent from zero in all specifications.
While Gurkha women might not be an appropriate control group due to potential
intrahousehold spillovers from an increase in education among Gurkha men, never-
theless, panel C compares education outcome for females aged 6 to 12 with 22 to 28,
in Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic groups. Based on table 1.4, column 5 the estimate
of the e↵ect of the rule change on Gurkha women of younger eligible cohort is -0.09
and not statistically di↵erent from zero. Given that all the estimates of coe cient  
are not statistically di↵erent from zero, the results from table 1.4 support the validity
of the identification assumption and suggest that the increase in education for age
eligible Gurkha men in Table 1.3 is likely caused by the change in the educational
requirement for the British Gurkha recruitment.
Table 1.5 shows the e↵ect of the rule change for each eligible birth-year cohort by
estimating  
x
s in equation (1.5) for 6  x  21. The comparison group consists of
ineligible cohort aged 22 to 28. In all specifications, the estimated e↵ect is statistically
significant at the 5% levels for Gurkha men 15 years or younger. The results in column
5 suggest that the rule change raised education for Gurkha men aged 15 by 0.69 years,
aged 12 by 0.95 years, and aged 6 by 1.38 years. Furthermore, in line with the natural
experiment, the e↵ect of the rule change increases with younger age due to the reasons
discussed in the earlier section. If the results are driven by the response to the rule
change, the estimated e↵ects would decrease with age for Gurkha men of eligible
cohort and be zero for all ineligible birth-year cohorts. I test this hypothesis by
estimating  
x
s in equation (1.5) for 6  x  35. The control group comprises of men
aged 36 and 37. The estimates of  
x
s are plotted in Figure 1.2.  
x
s fluctuate around
zero and statistically insignificant for all x   22 and increase as age decreases for
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x  21, providing further support for the internal validity of the natural experiment.
The rule change induced eligible Gurkha men who had no formal education at the
time of the rule change, to enroll in school for the first time. Table 1.6 presents the
e↵ect at the extensive margin, by estimating the coe cient   in equation (1.4) for
younger eligible cohort, where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating years
of education completed greater than zero. The results in column 5 suggest that the
proportion of young eligible Gurkha men with at least 1 year of education increased
by 10 percentage points. Given 51% of age ineligible Gurkha men have no formal
education, the rule change induced 19.5 percent of young eligible Gurkha men who
would not have received any formal education in the absence of the rule change, to
enroll in school. In comparison, Schultz (2004b) estimates that the Mexican Progresa
Program induced 10 percent of individuals who had no prior education to enroll in
school by reducing educational cost by as much as 75%.21
Individuals who were induced to enroll in school by the rule change and who
had already enrolled prior to the rule change, were further promoted to raise their
education because the new rule required 8 years of education. I estimate the impact at
di↵erent education levels by estimating the di↵erence in di↵erences in the cumulative
distribution function of education between young eligible and ineligible cohorts across
Gurkha and non-Gurkha men who have at least one year of education. Figure 1.3
depicts the estimates of  ss from equation (1.4), with a dummy dependent variable
indicating the level of education completed equal to or greater than s, for each s
= 2 to 15.22 Among Gurkha men of young eligible cohort with at least one year of
education, the share of those with 5 or more years (primary education) increased by 3
percentage points, 8 or more years (the requirement cuto↵) increased by 6 percentage
21These two results might not be directly comparable as PROGRESA started from higher enroll-
ment base and targeted poorest students. Because of these reasons, increasing schooling might have
been harder to achieve in the case of PROGRESA.
22The error terms in these 14 seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE) are correlated.
In Figure 1.3, the 95 percent confidence intervals for each  ss are adjusted for cross-equation error
correlation.
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points, and 13 or more years (tertiary education) increased by 9 percentage points.
The large impact at upper end of the education distribution is particularly sig-
nificant, given Jensen (2010) points out that in developing countries a combination
of costs, low family income, and credit constraints provides a relatively greater hin-
drance to secondary schooling compared to primary education as it requires a longer
term and more costly investment. For example, while 67% of Nepali boys in 1996
were enrolled in primary school, the net enrollment rate in lower secondary level (6-8
years) was merely 23% (1996 NLSS). Additionally, the positive impact on education
above 8 years could be due to the further increase in the British Gurkha educational
requirement from 8 to 10 years in 1997, or because higher education increased the
likelihood of success with the introduction of English and mathematics exams in the
selection process, or because eligible Gurkha men who completed 8 years of education
to comply with the new rule continued into higher education. Angrist and Imbens
(1995) find similar positive spillover e↵ects in the United States, where the compul-
sory attendance laws induced a fraction of the sample to complete some college as a
consequence of constraining them to complete high school.
In developing countries, socio-economic factors such as access to schools, costs,
credit constraints, and family income, limit individuals from attending school even
when they want to. I examine the e↵ect of these factors on individuals’ response to
the rule change, by separately estimating equation (1.4) across di↵erent population
characteristics. The results in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.7 indicate that the e↵ect of
the rule change did not vary across districts with and without easy access to schooling.
However, the di↵erence in average travel time to school between the bottom and top
quantile districts is only 0.3 hours, which reflects the emphasis put by the government
on improving access to school in remote areas of Nepal. The results in columns 4 and
5 indicate that the impact of the rule change was smaller for individuals living in
households that are involved in agricultural production. According to Nepal Living
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Standard Survey from 2004, more than 10% of school-age children who were not
enrolled in school indicated labor constraint in household work as the main cause
of their absenteeism. Furthermore, more than 20% of the school absenteeism was
caused by high financial cost of education. In oder to examine the role of poverty and
credit constraints on schooling, columns 6 and 7 separately estimate the e↵ect of the
rule change across household income, using ownership of television set as a proxy for
family wealth. In households that own a television set, Gurkha men of young eligible
cohort raised their education by 1.28 years; whereas, their counterparts living in the
household without a television set only raised their education by 0.76 years. The
F-test suggests that estimates are statistically di↵erent at the 10% level. While these
results should be interpreted with caution due to omitted variable bias, the stratified
results, nevertheless, could be potentially informative given they document the role
of poverty and credit constraints in limiting schooling in developing countries.
The majority of eligible Gurkha men would not join the British Gurkha Army
because only 300 individuals are recruited every year. However, higher education
could increase emigration rates of eligible Gurkha men through other channels besides
the British Gurkha recruitment. I estimate coe cient   in equation (1.4), with a
dummy dependent variable indicating whether the individual was living abroad in
2001. Given everyone in the older eligible cohort would have had the chance to apply
for the British Gurkha Army or pursue other emigration opportunities by 2001, I
focus on this cohort to examine whether the rule change led to greater emigration
among eligible Gurkha men. The estimates in Table 1.8, panel B suggest that there
was no increase in migration rates among older eligible Gurkha men. The coe cients
in all the specifications are zero and not statistically significant even at the 10% level.
On the other hand, Table 1.9 estimates the e↵ect of the rule change on education
of eligible Gurkha men who had not emigrated by 2001. I estimate coe cient   in
equation (1.4) by only including individuals who were living in Nepal in 2001. The
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results in column 5 suggest that the rule change raised education of young eligible
Gurkha men who had not emigrated by 1.14 years and older eligible Gurkha men of
similar nature by 0.40 years. Both the estimates are statistically significant at the 1%
level. Therefore, the results in Tables 1.8 and 1.9 together imply that the increase
in educational requirement for the British Gurkha Army led to a net increase in the
human capital stock of eligible Gurkha men.
1.6 Robustness
In the above empirical estimation, the non-Gurkha ethnic group may not be a
valid comparison for the Gurkha ethnic group because ineligible Gurkha cohorts have
significantly lower level of education than their non-Gurkha counterparts. To re-
fute the possibility that the results could be driven by age-varying unobserved ethnic
characteristics, I use a data-driven procedure developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) to construct a di↵erent comparison group. The new counterfactual– the syn-
thetic Gurkha ethnic group– is the convex combination of all non-Gurkha ethnicities
that most closely resemble the Gurkha ethnic group based on the education of age
ineligible men. For each non-Gurkha ethnicity, the average years of education is cal-
culated for each birth cohort and then ethnicity-weights are assigned to minimize the
di↵erence between education of Gurkha and synthetic Gurkha ethnic groups across
ineligible cohorts aged 22 to 44.23 Table 1.11 displays the weights of each non-Gurkha
ethnicity in the synthetic Gurkha ethnic group.
Figure 1.4 depicts the years of education completed for Gurkha and synthetic
Gurkha ethnic groups across birth cohorts aged 6 to 44. Education of the synthetic
Gurkha ethnic group closely matches that of the Gurkha ethnic group for ineligible
23The ethnicity-weights are calculated from the minimization problem: Choose W to minimize
(XG  XNW )(XG  XNW ), where W = {(w1, .....wJ)0 subject to w1 + .....+wJ = 1, wJ   0}. XG
is a (k X 1) vector of average years of education at each age ineligible birth cohorts for the Gurkha
ethnic group, where 21  k  44. XN is a (k X J) matrix with average years of education for k
ineligible birth cohorts and J non-Gurkha ethnicities.
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cohorts aged 22 to 44, suggesting that the eligible cohort of synthetic Gurkha ethnic
group provide a close approximation to the eligible cohort of Gurkha ethnic group
in the absence of the rule change. The di↵erence in education between Gurkha and
synthetic Gurkha ethnic groups for cohorts aged 6 to 21 could be interpreted as
the e↵ect of the increase in the British Gurkha education requirement. Figure 1.5
shows that education between Gurkha and synthetic Gurkha ethnic groups diverges
considerably for eligible cohorts and the gap, depicted in Figure 1.5, becomes larger for
younger cohorts, which is consistent with the results from the di↵erence-in-di↵erence
estimation.
The results could have also been obtained entirely by chance. Following Bertrand
et al. (2004), I iteratively apply the synthetic control method to all the non-Gurkha
ethnicities to examine whether assigning treatment at random produces results of
similar magnitude. In each case, the synthetic control is composed of the weighted
combination of the remaining non-Gurkha ethnicities. Figure 1.6 displays the results
of the placebo iterations for 10 non-Gurkha ethnicities. The faded lines show the
gap in education between each non-Gurkha ethnicity and its corresponding synthetic
version. The gap for Gurkha ethnic group, depicted by the dark line, is largest com-
pared to any non-Gurkha ethnicities. More importantly, the education gap between
Gurkha and synthetic Gurkha for eligible cohort is four times larger than the similar
gap for ineligible cohort. Figure 1.7 shows that this is largest among all ethnicities.
Given there are 11 di↵erent ethnicities, including Gurkha ethnic group, and thereby
11 di↵erent results, the probability of obtaining the largest e↵ect for Gurkha ethnic
group entirely by chance is 1/11 = 0.09. Therefore, it is unlikely that the estimated




The change in the educational requirement for the British Gurkha Army in 1993
led to an exogenous and di↵erential increase in skilled versus unskilled emigration
prospects for Gurkha men of eligible cohort living in Nepal. Using a set of di↵erence-
in-di↵erence and synthetic control strategies, I find that they responded to the rule
change by raising their human capital investment. I also find that the rule change
increased education for eligible Gurkha men who had not joined the British Gurkha or
emigrated elsewhere by 2001. These two findings validate the theoretical predictions
of the brain gain models: first, individuals’ human capital investments are endogenous
to their migration prospects; and second, when enough skilled individuals eventually
decide not to emigrate, it leads to a net increase in human capital stock at home.
The underlying mechanism of my unique natural experiment is not di↵erent from
economic factors influencing individuals’ emigration and human capital decisions in
many developing countries. Despite an extremely low chance of getting selected into
the British Gurkha Army, Gurkha men were induced to invest in education following
the rule change because of significant increase in income if they succeeded in joining
the British Army. Docquier et al. (2007) point out that these two factors, widening
international wage gaps and introduction of skilled-biased immigration policies, are
the main reasons for a rapid growth of skilled emigration and for inducing human
capital investment among potential emigrants in developing countries. Nevertheless,
they find that in 2000 the skilled emigration rate in developing countries was only
7%.
While the knowledge of the British Gurkha rule change was widespread, similar
information about other foreign labor markets may not be as readily available. Jensen
(2010) show that the lack of information regarding returns to education could lead
to underinvestment in human capital. Therefore, it might require an e cient flow
of information possibly through an active government intervention for individuals at
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home to know their educational returns abroad, and consequently, to increase their
human capital investment.
An important implication of my findings is that low-income countries do not
have to wait for improvements in their local productivity to stimulate human capital
investment because high wages in developed countries can motivate individuals in
developing countries to invest in education. While there is little doubt that low levels
of schooling deter economic growth, Schultz (1975) show that returns to schooling are
low in a stagnant economy, hinting at the possibility of a poverty trap. Oyelere (2009)
argue that poor institutions and political instability, characteristics that are common
across many developing countries, lead to low returns to education. Developing coun-
tries spend large sums of money on increasing human capital investment in order to
overcome low returns and push themselves out of the poverty trap, if it exists. For
example, Mexico’s Progresa Program which provides cash incentive to increase school
attendance, costs almost 0.2 percent of its GDP. Since skilled emigration prospects
raise educational returns in developing countries, it could either replace expensive
policy interventions like Progresa or complement these programs, making them more
attractive to their potential recipients.
Interesting future research includes investigating the welfare impact on eligible
Gurkha men who who could not join the British Gurkha Army. Increase in their edu-
cation could raise their domestic earnings, improve their children’s health outcomes,
and promote long-term economic growth in their regions. Similarly, the rule change
also created numerous positive and negative externalities on other populations that
were not directly a↵ected by it. First, an increase in education by Gurkha men could
directly a↵ect their peers’ education decisions. On one hand, it decreases the quality
of education by crowding out classrooms; whereas, on the other hand, greater class
participation could lead to a positive learning experience for other classmates. This
provides a useful experiment to investigate peer e↵ects, which is an integral part of
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education research. Second, raising Gurkha men’s education could also a↵ect the
education of their siblings, mainly female siblings who were not a↵ected by the rule
change. Given key socio-economic decisions including children’s education are taken
at household-level, investigation into the specific mechanisms governing this intra-
household tradeo↵s is important. It would allow for better evaluation of existing
household interventions and development of more e↵ective policies in the future.
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Figure 1.1: Map of Nepal with Concentration of Gurkha Ethnic Group and the British
Gurkha Recruitment Centers
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Figure 1.2: E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of Gurkha Men







Notes: The figure above plots  
x
s for 6  x  35 from equation (1.5). Since each  
x
estimates the e↵ect of the rule change on Gurkha men of age x in 1993,  
x
should be
zero for x   21 and increase as x decreases for x < 21.
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Figure 1.3: Di↵erence in Di↵erences in CDF (Estimated from Linear Probability
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Years of Education
Notes: The figure plots  s estimated from equation (1.4) with a dummy dependent
variable indicating the years of education completed greater than or equal to s, for
each s = 2 to 14. The error terms in these 14 seemingly unrelated regression equations
(SURE) are correlated. The 95 percent confidence intervals for each  ss are adjusted
for cross-equation error correlation. The sample includes men from younger eligible
cohorts aged 6 to 12 or ineligible cohort aged 22 to 28, with at least 1 year of education
completed. Each  s indicate the impact of the rule change at the education level s
among Gurkha men of younger eligible cohort with at least 1 year of schooling.
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Notes: The graph above plots the average years of education completed as of 2001
at each birth cohort for Gurkha and synthetic Gurkha ethnic groups. The syn-
thetic Gurkha is a weighted sum of all the non-Gurkha ethnicities. The weights
are calculated to minimize the squared di↵erence in average education of Gurkha
and synthetic Gurkha ethnic groups across birth cohorts aged 22 to 44. Based
on the mathematical algorithm provided by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), I choose





















is a (k X 1) vector of average years of education
at each age ineligible birth cohorts for the Gurkha ethnic group, where 21  k  44.
X
N
is a (k X J) matrix with average years of education for k ineligible birth cohorts
and J non-Gurkha ethnicities.
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Notes: The figure plots the di↵erence between average education of Gurkha and
synthetic Gurkha ethnic groups for each birth cohorts aged 6 to 44, i.e. the di↵erence
between the education trends of the two groups from Figure 1.4.
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Notes:The figure plots the gaps same as Figure 1.5 for Gurkha ethnicity in the dark
line and similar gaps for 10 non-Gurkha ethnicities in faded lines. For each non-
Gurkha ethnicity, its synthetic counterpart is calculated by assigning weights to the
remaining non-Gurkha ethnicities in order to minimize the squared di↵erence in av-
erage education between the two groups across birth cohorts aged 22 to 44.
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Figure 1.7: Significance Test: Ratio of Eligible and Ineligible Cohort Education Gap
for Gurkha and Non-Gurkha Ethnicities












Notes: The figure shows the ratio of average di↵erence in education between





. This is largest for Gurkha ethnicity, which means that
the probability of getting this result by chance is 1/11 = 0.09.
34
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Whole Sample Gurkha Non-Gurkha
Panel A: Individual Level Means
2001 Census of Nepal
Total Sample 1389705 245148 1144557
% of sample - 17.6% 82.4%
Literacy Rate 55.2% 53.2% 55.6%
male 69.5% 66.9% 70.0%
female 41.3% 41.0% 41.4%
Level of Education 4.07 3.28 4.24
aged 6-12 in 1993 5.41 5.08 5.48
male 6.17 5.74 6.26
female 4.64 4.46 4.68
aged 13-21 in 1993 4.89 3.96 5.08
male 6.38 5.20 6.61
female 3.53 2.95 3.66
aged 22-28 in 1993 3.41 2.33 3.62
male 5.08 3.64 5.34
female 1.82 1.22 1.95
aged 29-37 in 1993 2.49 1.46 2.71
male 3.97 2.44 4.28
female 1.02 0.55 1.12
aged 38-44 in 1993 1.88 1.03 2.10
male 3.10 1.76 3.42
female 0.60 0.30 0.67
Percent of Population Born in Urban 31.3% 18.2% 34.1%
aged 6-12 34.7% 21.1% 37.8%
aged 13-21 32.7% 19.6% 35.4%
aged 22-28 30.3% 17.3% 32.9%
aged 29-37 27.8% 15.0% 30.5%
aged 38-44 25.6% 13.2% 29.0%
Panel B: Household Level Means
1996 NLSS
Total Sample 3373 544 2829
% of Sample - 16.1% 83.9%
Household Size 5.59 5.27 5.65
Access to School 0.38 Hrs 0.54 Hrs 0.35 Hrs
Access to Paved Road 9.30 Hrs 14.45 Hrs 8.30 Hrs
Percent of Household in Poverty 33.5% 48.5% 46.9%
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Table 1.2: Mean Education by Cohort and Ethnicity
Level of Education Completed
Gurkha Non-Gurkha Di↵erence
Panel A: Experiment 1
Male aged 6 to 12 in 1993 5.74 6.26 -0.53
(0.018) (0.009) (0.022)
Male aged 22 to 28 in 1993 3.64 5.34 -1.71
(0.031) (0.016) (0.039)
Di↵erence 2.10 0.92 1.18
(0.034) (0.017) (0.042)
Panel B: Experiment 2
Male aged 13 to 21 in 1993 5.20 6.61 -1.41
(0.026) (0.013) (0.031)
Male aged 22 to 28 in 1993 3.64 5.34 -1.71
(0.031) (0.016) (0.039)
Di↵erence 1.56 1.27 0.29
(0.041) (0.020) (0.049)
Notes: This table reports the mean education completed as of 2001 for men of di↵erent
cohorts and ethnic groups. While Gurkha ethnic men of age 21 and younger were a↵ected
by the rule change, those who were 6 -12 years old were more likely to have been enrolled
in school at the time of the rule change and, thereby, be in a better position to change
their education. On the other hand, the ability of older eligible men aged 13 to 21 to
respond to the rule change is determined by the years of education that they have
had completed in 1993. Hence, this older eligible cohort includes Gurkha men some
of whom were a↵ected by the rule change and others who were not.
The standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.3: E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of Eligible
Gurkha Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent Var: Gurkha*Eligible
Panel A: Experiment 1
Eligible Cohort: Males aged 6 to 12 1.27** 1.19** 1.17** 1.20** 1.11**
Ineligible Cohort: Males aged 22 to 28 (0.340) (0.342) (0.364) (0.386) (0.342)
Obs: 325,876
Panel B: Experiment 2
Eligible Cohort: Males aged 13 to 21 0.45** 0.42** 0.42** 0.46** 0.39**
Ineligible Cohort: Males aged 22 to 28 (0.108) (0.115) (0.100) (0.104) (0.114)
Obs: 300,327
Control Variables:
Age Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of Birth Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*District of Birth Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Rural Birth Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Primary School Teachera No No No Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Secondary School Teacherb No No No Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Access to Schoolc No No No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates of  , the coe cient of interaction between Gurkha
dummy and eligible cohort dummy from equation (1.4). The dependent variable is the
years of education completed as of 2001. Specifications correct for various time-varying
geographic and ethnic characteristics that could be correlated with education and bias the
estimate. Eligible Gurkha men aged 6 -12 years old were more likely to have been enrolled
in primary school at the time of the rule change and, thereby, would have been in a better
position to change their education compared to eligible men aged 13 to 21. Hence, I use
Panel A as the preferred experiment for analysis.
aPrimary School Teacher is district-level total number of primary school teachers
in pubic schools in 1994.
bSecondary School Teacher is district-level total number of secondary school teach-
ers in pubic schools in 1994.
cAccess to School is ethnicity-level average distance-time to school in 1996 calcu-
lated using 1996 NLSS.
The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for within-ethnicity cor-
relation between individuals.
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level
** indicates significance at the 1 percent level
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Table 1.4: E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of Ineligible
Gurkha Men and Eligible Gurkha Women (Falsification Tests)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent Var: Gurkha*Eligible
Panel A: Control Experiment 1
Eligible Cohort: Males aged 22 to 28 0.23 0.23 -0.02 0.03 0.01
Ineligible Cohort: Males aged 29 to 35 (0.213) (0.224) (0.186) (0.176) (0.166)
Obs: 214,315
Panel B: Control Experiment 2
Eligible Cohort: Males aged 22 to 28 -0.09 -0.06 -0.48 -0.43 -0.62
Ineligible Cohort: Males aged 38 to 44 (0.241) (0.428) (0.261) (0.467) (0.466)
Obs: 192,046
Panel C: Control Experiment 3
Eligible Cohort: Females aged 6 to 12 0.57 0.54 0.12 0.17 -0.09
Ineligible Cohort: Females aged 22 to 28 (0.408) (0.407) (0.345) (0.332) (0.351)
Obs: 333,055
Control Variables:
Age Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of Birth Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*District of Birth Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Rural Birth Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Primary School Teacher No No No Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Secondary School Teacher No No No Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Access to School No No No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates of  , the coe cient of interaction between Gurkha
dummy and eligible cohort dummy from equation (1.4). All three experiments estimate the
e↵ect on individuals who were not a↵ected by the rule change. Panel A and B estimates
the e↵ect on Gurkha men of cohorts, aged 22 to 28. In panel B, the age di↵erence between
the two cohorts aged 22 to 28 and aged 38 to 44 is the same as in panel A of Table 1.4.
Panel C estimates the e↵ect on Gurkha women of eligible cohort aged 6 to 12. None of the
Gurkha women were a↵ected because the recruitment of British Gurkha is limited to men.
The lack of significant results in these three control experiments provide support for the
validity of the identification assumption used in Table 1.4 that the di↵erence in education
between the cohorts would have been same across Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic groups
in the absence of the rule change.
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level
** indicates significance at the 1 percent level
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Table 1.5: E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of Eligible
Gurkha Men at Each Birth Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gurkha*Age 21 -0.30 -0.32 -0.18 -0.14 -0.20
(0.162) (0.167) (0.119) (0.120) (0.149)
Gurkha*Age 20 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.18
(0.115) (0.132) (0.119) (0.122) (0.189)
Gurkha*Age 19 0.31* 0.30* 0.32** 0.36** 0.34**
(0.104) (0.110) (0.070) (0.062) (0.079)
Gurkha*Age 18 0.20 0.17 0.25* 0.30* 0.27
(0.118) (0.121) (0.094) (0.093) (0.142)
Gurkha*Age 17 0.86** 0.85** 0.54* 0.59* 0.40
(0.192) (0.188) (0.184) (0.181) (0.188)
Gurkha*Age 16 0.23 0.22 0.31 0.34 0.36
(0.186) (0.182) (0.155) (0.163) (0.190)
Gurkha*Age 15 0.50* 0.49* 0.64** 0.69** 0.60**
(0.196) (0.203) (0.171) (0.166) (0.181)
Gurkha*Age 14 0.74** 0.71** 0.70** 0.72** 0.56**
(0.138) (0.136) (0.161) (0.180) (0.182)
Gurkha*Age 13 0.65** 0.57* 0.65** 0.69** 0.68**
(0.200) (0.209) (0.205) (0.218) (0.194)
Gurkha*Age 12 1.13** 1.09** 0.91** 0.95** 0.80**
(0.223) (0.220) (0.214) (0.227) (0.213)
Gurkha*Age 11 0.94** 0.86* 0.94** 0.98** 0.81**
(0.293) (0.298) (0.281) (0.303) (0.265)
Gurkha*Age 10 1.23** 1.12** 1.01* 1.06** 0.98**
(0.224) (0.229) (0.276) (0.297) (0.256)
Gurkha*Age 9 1.08** 1.01* 1.06* 1.09* 1.04*
(0.377) (0.373) (0.371) (0.394) (0.351)
Gurkha*Age 8 1.39** 1.27** 1.31** 1.33** 1.25**
(0.409) (0.413) (0.405) (0.428) (0.418)
Gurkha*Age 7 1.51** 1.41** 1.38* 1.39* 1.34*
(0.454) (0.466) (0.491) (0.513) (0.462)
Gurkha*Age 6 1.39* 1.30* 1.38* 1.38* 1.36*
(0.601) (0.598) (0.557) (0.579) (0.541)
Control Variables:
District of Birth Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*District of Birth Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Rural Birth Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Primary School Teacher No No No Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Secondary School Teacher No No No Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Access to School No No No No Yes
Notes: All specifications include age and ethnicity fixed e↵ects. The standard errors are adjusted
for within-ethnicity correlation between individuals.
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Table 1.6: E↵ect of the Rule Change on School Enrollment of Young Eligible Gurkha
Men (Using Linear Probability Model)
Obs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Extensive Margin
Dep Var: Dummy Indicating
Years of Education >0
325,876 0.12** 0.12** 0.10** 0.10* 0.10*
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
Control Variables:
Age Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of Birth Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*District of Birth Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Rural Birth Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Primary School Teacher No No No Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Secondary School Teacher No No No Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Access to School No No No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates of  , the coe cient of interaction between Gurkha
dummy and eligible cohort dummy, from equation (1.4) with a dummy dependent variable
indicating the years of education completed greater zero. The sample includes men from
younger eligible cohorts aged 6 to 12 or ineligible cohort aged 22 to 28. Because prior to
the introduction of educational requirement in 1993 no formal education required to join
the British Gurkha Army, the above coe cients estimate the e↵ect of the rule change at
the extensive margin. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for
within-ethnicity correlation between individuals.
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level
** indicates significance at the 1 percent level
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Table 1.7: E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of Young Eligible
Gurkha Men (Di↵erential E↵ect)
Whole Distance to Schoola Household Enterpriseb Household Incomec
Sample Median >Median Ag Land No Ag Land Owns TV No TV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1.17** 1.16* 1.18** 0.86* 1.34** 1.29** 0.76**
(0.364) (0.416) (0.347) (0.284) (0.391) (0.320) (0.269)
325,879 181,159 144,717 130,698 195,178 86,851 239,025
Notes: This table reports the estimates of  , the coe cient of interaction between Gurkha
dummy and eligible dummy from equation (4). The dependent variable is the years of
education completed as of 2001. The sample includes men of eligible cohort aged 6 to 12
and ineligible cohort aged 22 to 28. All the columns use specification from column 3 in
Table 1.4, which includes ethnicity dummies, age dummies, district of birth dummies, age
dummies*district of birth dummies, and age dummies*rural birth dummies.
aDistance to School: Sample divided into two categories based on average travel
time to school in 1996: individuals born in (1) districts with average travel time to
school  median district-level travel time and (2) districts with average travel time
to school   median district-level travel time. The median district-level travel time to
school is 0.36 hours.
bHousehold Enterprise: Sample divided into two categories based on ownership of
agricultural land and livestocks in 2001.
cHousehold Income: Sample divided into two categories based on ownership of a
television set in 2001.
The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for within-ethnicity cor-
relation between individuals.
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level
** indicates significance at the 1 percent level
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Table 1.8: E↵ect of the Rule Change on Migration of Eligible Gurkha Men (Using
Linear Probability Model)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Var: Dummy Indicating
Foreign Residence in 2001
Panel A: Experiment 1
Eligible Cohort: Males aged 6 to 12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01** -0.01** -0.01**
Ineligible Cohort: Males aged 22 to 28 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Obs: 325,876
Panel B: Experiment 2
Eligible Cohort: Males aged 13 to 21 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Ineligible Cohort: Males aged 22 to 28 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs: 300,327
Control Variables:
Age Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of Birth Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*District of Birth Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Rural Birth Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Primary School Teachera No No No Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Secondary School Teacherb No No No Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Access to Schoolc No No No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates of  , the coe cient of interaction between Gurkha
dummy and eligible cohort dummy from equation (4). The dependent variable is the dummy
variable indicating whether the individual is living abroad in 2001. Eligible Gurkha men,
especially cohort aged 13 to 21, would have had the opportunity to apply for the British
Gurkha Army by 2001 and also to seek other emigration opportunities. The coe cients are
statistically insignificant for cohort aged 13 to 21, suggesting that the increase in education
in response to the rule change did not increase their propensity to emigrate. If anything,
the emigration is reduced for eligible Gurkha men aged 6 to 12, as suggested by the negative
and statistically significant coe cients in Panel A.
aPrimary School Teacher is district-level total number of primary school teachers
in pubic schools in 1994.
bSecondary School Teacher is district-level total number of secondary school teach-
ers in pubic schools in 1994.
cAccess to School is ethnicity-level average distance-time to school in 1996 calcu-
lated using 1996 NLSS.
The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for within-ethnicity cor-
relation between individuals.
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level
** indicates significance at the 1 percent level
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Table 1.9: E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of Eligible
Gurkha Men (Non-Migrants)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent Var: Gurkha*Eligible
Panel A: Experiment 1
Eligible Cohort: Males aged 6 to 12 1.30** 1.22** 1.19** 1.22** 1.14**
Ineligible Cohort: Males aged 22 to 28 (0.341) (0.344) (0.366) (0.388) (0.344)
Obs: 320,592
Panel B: Experiment 2
Eligible Cohort: Males aged 13 to 21 0.45** 0.42** 0.42** 0.46** 0.40**
Ineligible Cohort: Males aged 22 to 28 (0.108) (0.116) (0.101) (0.105) (0.114)
Obs: 293,946
Control Variables:
Age Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of Birth Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*District of Birth Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Rural Birth Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Primary School Teachera No No No Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Secondary School Teacherb No No No Yes Yes
Age Dummies*Access to Schoolc No No No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimates of  , the coe cient of interaction between Gurkha
dummy and eligible cohort dummy from equation (4). The dependent variable is the years
of education completed as of 2001. The sample includes only men who had not emigrated by
2001. Specifications correct for various time-varying geographic and ethnic characteristics
that could be correlated with education and bias the estimate. Eligible Gurkha men, espe-
cially cohort aged 13 to 21, would have had the opportunity to apply for the British Gurkha
Army by 2001 and also to seek other emigration opportunities. The positive impact on the
education of eligible Gurkha men who had not emigrated suggests that the rule change led
to a net increase in the human capital stock of eligible Gurkha men.
aPrimary School Teacher is district-level total number of primary school teachers
in pubic schools in 1994.
bSecondary School Teacher is district-level total number of secondary school teach-
ers in pubic schools in 1994.
cAccess to School is ethnicity-level average distance-time to school in 1996 calcu-
lated using 1996 NLSS.
The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for within-ethnicity cor-
relation between individuals.
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level
** indicates significance at the 1 percent level
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Table 1.10: Lifetime Earnings of British Gurkha Soldier
Timeline Income Present Value
of Incomea
1. Recruitment into the British Gurkha at age 20b
New Entrant $20,880.00 $20,880.00
Rifleman (Level 1) $26,037.00 $25,776.63
Rifleman (Level 2) $28,068.00 $27,509.45
Rifleman (Level 3) $31,000.00 $30,079.27
Rifleman (Level 4) $33,320.00 $32,007.06
Rifleman (Level 5) $36,842.00 $35,036.38
Lance Corporal (Level 1) $38,634.00 $36,373.14
Lance Corporal (Level 2) $40,407.00 $37,661.96
Lance Corporal (Level 3) $42,224.00 $38,961.97
Lance Corporal (Level 4) $44,256.00 $40,428.62
Lance Corporal (Level 5) $44,256.00 $40,024.33
Corporal (Level 1) $44,256.00 $39,624.09
Corporal (Level 2) $44,286.00 $39,254.44
Corporal (Level 3) $46,454.00 $40,764.36
Corporal (Level 4) $47,539.00 $41,299.31
Corporal (Level 5) $48,686.00 $41,872.80
Corporal (Level 6) $49,694.00 $42,312.34
Corporal (Level 7) $50,779.00 $42,803.81
Sergeant (Level 1) $50,779.00 $42,375.77
Sergeant (Level 2) $51,424.00 $42,484.90
Sergeant (Level 3) $52,727.00 $43,125.78
Sergeant (Level 4) $53,392.00 $43,232.99
Sergeant (Level 5) $54,432.00 $43,634.36
Sergeant (Level 6) $55,471.00 $44,022.58
Sergeant (Level 7) $56,512.00 $44,400.24
Subtotal $1,092,355.00 $955,946.58
44
Lifetime Earnings of British Gurkha Soldier (Continued)
2. Retirement from British Gurkha at age 45c
(Between age 45 to 65, the pension is calculated
under Early Departure Payments Structure)
(i) Between 45 to 55:
Highest Pensionable Salary*Years of Service*1/70*(50%+8.3335%)=
56512*25*1/70*58.3335%=$11,773.37
x 10= $117,733.67 $87,562.87
1st Lump Sum = 3 * Pension $35,320.11 $27,472.74
Subtotal $153,053.78 $115,035.61
(ii) Between 55 to 65:




(After age 65, the pension is calculated under AFPS 05)
(iii) Between age 65 to 75d:
Highest Pensionable Salary*Years of Service*1/70=
56512*25*1/70=$20,182.85
x10= $201,828.57 $122,773.76
2nd Lump Sum = 3 * Pension $60,548.57 $38,520.11
Subtotal $262,377.14 $161,293.87
Total $1,659,157.35 $1,334,091.81
Notes: This table reports the lifetime income of a typical Gurkha soldier, including annual
salary, benefits, and pensions.
a Present value of income is calculated using a discount factor of 0.99. If income in the third
year of service is $28,068, then the present value of third year’s income is 0.992*28,068 =
$27,509.45
b Salary structure for British Gurkha soldier is based on “Rates of Pay as of April 2009”
published by the UK Ministry of Defense
c Pension scheme is based on “Armed Forces Pension Scheme 05: Your Pension Scheme
Explained” published by Service Personnel Policy (Pensions), The UK Ministry of Defense
on January 2007.
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Notes: This table reports the weights on each non-Gurkha ethnicities in the synthetic
Gurkha ethnic group. The weights are calculated to minimize the mean squared di↵erence
between the education of Gurkha and synthetic Gurkha ethnic groups across ages 22 to






















is a (k X 1) vector of average years of education at each age ineligible birth cohorts
for the Gurkha ethnic group, where 21  k  44. X
N
is a (k X J) matrix with average
years of education for k ineligible birth cohorts and J non-Gurkha ethnicities.
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CHAPTER II
Sibling Rivalry in Education: Estimation of
Intrahousehold Trade-o↵s in Human Capital
Investment
2.1 Introduction
Households are key decision-makers of their children’s human capital investment,
which is a crucial determinant of their welfare and their country’s economic growth.
Sub-Saharan African countries spent on average 5% of its gross domestic product on
education in 2008.1 Despite this, half of all children still do not complete primary
education in more than one-third of these countries. Improving educational outcomes
for children requires a better understanding of the mechanisms that govern their
households’ investment decisions.
Standard household models developed by Becker (1981) and Newman and Gertler
(1994), identify various factors that a↵ect schooling, one of which is the trade-o↵
among household members. The theoretical model suggests that a child’s educational
outcome could a↵ect the education of other children living in the same household.
An increase in the child’s education shifts resources away from other children in
1The emphasis on education is illustrated by the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
where two of the eight goals focus on education–achieve universal primary education and achieve
gender equality at all levels of education by 2015.
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the household. It decreases the household’s current income by limiting the child’s
ability to participate in the labor market. While these two mechanisms suggest a
negative trade-o↵ between siblings’ education, it could also have a positive impact
by decreasing the per-child fixed cost of education, increasing the permanent income
of the household, and decreasing the marginal benefit from leisure for other children.
Therefore, an increase in the child’s education can either raise or lower the education
of other children in the household and estimating whether this e↵ect is positive or
negative becomes an empirical question.
The causal estimation of the “inter-sibling” e↵ect in education is, however, con-
strained by endogeneity concerns. Strauss and Thomas (1995) point out that there
are significant unobserved heterogeneity across households that a↵ect their members’
educational outcomes. Hence using the child’s education to estimate its impact on
the education of other children in the household leads to a biased estimate because
unobserved household characteristics are likely to be correlated with the education of
all the children in the household. Moreover, the child’s education a↵ects other chil-
dren’s education and vice versa. Manski (1993) argues that this reflection problem
could lead to a biased estimate of the e↵ect of child’s education on other children
living in the household.
The ideal experiment requires two groups of households from developing countries–
treatment and control households, that are similar in all socio-economic character-
istics. Furthermore, the children in each households are randomly divided into two
groups– targeted and non-targeted children. The targeted children from the treat-
ment household experience an exogenous increase in educational attainment. The
di↵erence in education between the non-targeted children in the treatment household
and the non-targeted children in the control household could be interpreted as the
inter-sibling e↵ect in education.
A unique event occurred in Nepal in 1993 that resembled key aspects of the ideal
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experiment. The British Gurkha tradition involves an annual recruitment of Nepali
men by the British government into the British Armed Forces. Due to historical
reasons, the majority of British Gurkha soldiers are comprised of 5 out of 15 ethnic
groups of Nepal. These five ethnic groups are of Mongolian-Tibeto origin and are
referred to as the “Gurkha” ethnic group for the remainder of this paper. All the
other ethnic groups are referred to as “non-Gurkha”s.
The natural experiment involves a change in British Gurkha Army recruitment
regulations. In 1993, the British government changed the educational requirement
for the British Gurkha Army applicants, from requiring no education to requiring a
minimum of 8th grade education. The change was prompted by a broader ideological
shift within the British Army regarding the importance of educated and well-trained
soldiers2. As a result, the timing of the change is exogenous to social, economic, or
political characteristics of Nepal and mainly a↵ected the men from the Gurkha ethnic
group who were age eligible to apply to the British Gurkha Army in 1993.
This creates a unique natural experiment in which age eligible men from the
Gurkha ethnic group exclusively experienced an exogenous change in their educa-
tional returns and as a consequence, change in their educational outcomes. More
importantly, since women are ineligible to join the British Gurkha Army, women
of Gurkha ethnic groups were only a↵ected by the rule change through an increase
in the education of age-eligible Gurkha men living in their household. As a conse-
quence, Gurkha females with age eligible male sibling comprise the treatment group;
whereas, the control group includes the Gurkha females who do not have age eligible
male siblings and all non-Gurkha females.
The results suggest that the existence of at least one age eligible male sibling in
the household decreased the education of Gurkha girls by 0.11 years, which implies
a decrease of 7% from their mean education of 1.56 years. Moreover, the results
2“King’s Statement to the Commons on Future Defense Structure.” The Times. July 26, 1990
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indicate that the estimated negative inter-sibling e↵ect decreases with greater child
spacing, increases with greater number of age eligible male siblings, increases with
household’s involvement in agricultural production, and decreases with more remote
access to school.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the household
models that highlight the interaction among its members. Section 3 describes the
natural experiment used for causal identification. Section 4 describes the data used
for empirical estimation. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 presents
robustness for the identification strategy. Section 7 identifies potential mechanisms
that jointly determine the results and Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Previous Literature
The important role of education in fostering long-term economic growth in devel-
oping countries have motivated economists and policymakers to examine how house-
holds could be encouraged to increase their demand for their children’s education.
Angrist and Lavy (1999) use Maimonides rule to determine the class size in Israel
and find that reducing class size had positive impact on test scores of fourth and
fifth graders. Kremer et al. (2009) find that introducing merit based scholarships
for girls in Kenya significantly increased their school attendance and academic exam
scores. They also find positive spillover e↵ects among girls who were unlikely to win
the scholarship and boys who were ineligible for the scholarship. Duflo and Hanna
(2005) find that increasing teacher attendance in India increased student grades and
improved their graduation rate by 62%. Schultz (2004a) suggest that the Progresa
program, a conditional educational grant, in rural Mexico increased education by
10%.
These studies examine the impact of educational policies but ignore the spillover
e↵ect of these policies on non-targeted household members. Angelucci et al. (2009)
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find that the Progresa program only a↵ected the schooling of secondary school-age
children whose extended household included the primary school-age children receiving
cash transfers. They identify the redistribution of resources within the family net-
work as the main mechanism driving this result. This suggests that the interactions
among household members and the division of resources among them are crucial in
determining how household members respond to various education policies. It also
suggests that education interventions could create spillover e↵ects on non-targeted
household members, which might lead to a over- or under-estimation of the overall
impact of these policies.
The models of household behavior have been critical in identifying numerous mech-
anisms that govern the household decision making process. Household production
models (Becker , 1965; Gronau, 1977; Becker , 1981; Newman and Gertler , 1994) sug-
gest that households maximize their welfare given their resource constraints. One
of the key aspects of these theoretical models is the allocation of time of household
members across various market and non-market activities, including leisure, labor,
home production, and human capital investment.
The division of labor and resources among household members is determined by
the members’ characteristics and market factors. According to Becker (1965, 1981),
household members who are relatively more e cient at certain activities would also
spend more of their time on those activities compared to other members. This sug-
gests that the household members’ socio-economic choices, which the household has
control over, including human capital investment, are related to observed and unob-
served household characteristics and therefore, should be treated as endogenous.
Bommier and Lambert (2000) find that the di↵erences in male and female marriage
markets in Tanzania could explain the gender based di↵erences in school enrollment
age. They find that households send their daughter to school at a younger age and also
leave school at a younger age than their sons in order to maximize the present value
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of the bride price. Behrman et al. (1982) find that parents spend more household re-
sources on the children with relatively smaller genetic endowment because they value
their o↵-springs’ earnings equality. These findings underscore the interdependency of
a household member’s socio-economic outcomes with the household preferences and
household members’ characteristics.
The household production model also highlights the trade-o↵s among household
members in socio-economic activities, such as consumption, leisure, and human cap-
ital investment. Becker (1965) points out that an increase in the relative e ciency
of any member on performing certain activities would result in a reallocation of the
time spent by all other members away from those activities. Newman and Gertler
(1994) find that the time worked on farm by any family member a↵ects the marginal
benefit to farm work for all the family members. They also find that an increase in
the leisure of a member a↵ects the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption for other household members. These results suggest that the household
members’ choices are interrelated and the interactions among household members are
crucial in determining household outcomes, including its members’ human capital
investment.
Pitt et al. (1990) investigate the e↵ect of child morbidity on the activities of other
household members. They find that an increase in child morbidity in a household
does not a↵ect male siblings but a↵ects mother and female siblings, where the mother
shifts out of labor force into home care and female siblings drop out of school into
the home production. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980), Lee (2008), and Qian (2009)
study the e↵ect of an increase in the number of children on the household on child
quality, including human capital investment. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) use twin
births as an exogenous increase in the number of children to find that it has a negative
impact on schooling in rural India. Lee (2008) uses the son preferences and the first
child’s gender to determine that a greater number of siblings have adverse e↵ects on
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per-child investment in education. Using the relaxation of one child policy in rural
China as an exogenous increase in family size, Qian (2009), on the other hand, finds
that an additional sibling increases school enrollment of the first child by 8-17%.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
The e↵ect of increasing a child’s education on the education choices of other
children in the household is ambiguous. The educational outcome of the other children
is partly governed by the intra-household interactions, triggered by the increase in
education of the child, as suggested by the earlier studies (Becker , 1965; Behrman
et al., 1982; Pitt et al., 1990; Newman and Gertler , 1994; Lee, 2008; Angelucci et al.,
2009; Qian, 2009). Some of the mechanisms, such as the redistribution of household
resources and decrease in household income, suggest a negative impact of increasing a
child’s education on the education of other children; whereas other mechanisms, such
as the lowering of per child fixed costs of schooling, increase in permanent household
income, and the economies of scale in leisure, indicate a positive inter-sibling e↵ect
in education. Hence, an increase in the chid’s education can either raise or lower
the education of other children in the household and estimating whether this e↵ect
is positive or negative becomes an empirical question.
The causal estimation of the inter-sibling e↵ect in education is, however, con-
strained by endogeneity concerns because of the unobserved heterogeneity across
households that are correlated with the education of all their members as indicated by
Strauss and Thomas (1995) and due to the reflection problem highlighted by Manski
(1993). The ideal experiment requires dividing the households with multiple chil-
dren into two random groups– treatment and control households. Furthermore, the
children in only the treatment households are randomly divided into two groups–
treatment and control children. The treatment children in these households are sub-
ject to an exogenous increase in education. Under these circumstances, the di↵erence
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in the educational attainment between the control children in the treatment house-
holds and the children in the control households could be interpreted as the causal
estimate of the inter-sibling e↵ect in education.
A unique event occurred in Nepal in 1993 that resembled key aspects of the ideal
experiment. It involves a change in the education requirement a↵ecting the recruit-
ment of Nepalese men by the British government into the British Armed Forces.
2.3.1 British Brigade of Gurkha
Nepal is a landlocked country surrounded by India on three sides and China to
its north. Its geographical position historically made it a melting ground for people
and cultures from both north and south of its border (Shrestha, 2001b). The 1996
National Living Standard Survey categorizes the population of Nepal into 15 ethnic
groups. Out of them, the Gurkha ethnic group is comprised of 5 Mongoloid tribal
groups—the Rai, Limbu, Gurung, Magar, and Tamang, who settled in the eastern
and central hills of Nepal during the initial wave of migration from north.
The recruitment of Nepalese men into the British Army started after the Anglo-
Gurkha war (1814-1817). The treaty of Sugauli following the end of the war in 1817
allowed the British to set up three Gurkha regiments in the British Indian Army.
The early recruits included ethnic groups such as the Rajput, Thakuri, Chetri, and
Brahman, who migrated from south and were closely associated with the ethnicities
found in India. In 1857, Indian soldiers serving in the British Indian Army led a
mutiny against the British rule. Although the rebellion was eventually contained in
1858, the British became wary of Indian nationals serving in their army. Rathaur
(2001) and Caplan (1995) argue that as a result, the British also stopped recruiting
Nepalese men belonging to the ethnicities that originated from India into the British
Gurkha Army. According to Rathaur (2001) after 1857, the new Nepali recruits in
the British Gurkha Army were mainly drawn from the Rai, Limbu, Gurung, Magar,
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and Tamang ethnic groups who, unlike other ethnicities in Nepal, had migrated from
north. This ethnicity bias in the recruitment of the British Gurkha Army continues to
exist till present day as majority of the current British Gurkha soldiers are comprised
of these 5 Mongolian-Tibeto ethnic groups.
The benefits from joining the British Gurkha Army is substantial. The present
value of the lifetime income of serving in the British Gurkha Army for 25 years is
estimated to be about $1,522,750 (Shrestha, 2011). This includes a starting salary
of $21,000 and a lifelong annual pension of about $15,000 after serving for 25 years.
According to Caplan (1995), remittances from Gurkha soldiers and pensions for ex-
Gurkha soldiers were the country’s largest earner of foreign currency until recent
development of tourism and other sources of migration. More importantly, the pay
and pensions of the servicemen are the major source of capital in most Mongolian-
Tibeto communities in the hills of Nepal whose main alternative employment is limited
to farming.3 The financial benefits of British Gurkha Army in these communities is
evident from quotes documented by Caplan (1995) such as, “One of my boys has gone
to the Army, we have only that hope.”
2.3.2 Natural Experiment: A Change in Education Criteria
Education is an important aspect of the selection process. Since 1997, the recruits
must have completed at least 10 years of education. However prior to 1993, no formal
education was required to join the British Gurkha Army. Moreover, the selection
process was strictly limited to physical examinations. In 1993, the British Army
changed its educational requirement and the new Gurkha recruits were required to
have completed at least 8 years of education. Following the change in educational
requirement, mathematics and English grammar tests were added to the selection
3The Defense Committee of the British House of Commons in 1989 suggested that the annual




The change in educational requirement was a result of a series of defense reviews,
termed “Option for Change,” conducted by the UKMinistry of Defense in early 1990s.
The Option for Change led to an extensive restructuring of the British Armed Forces
in order to cut defense spending after the end of the Cold War. It led to a reduction
in service manpower by 18% to an Army of around 120,0004. More importantly, it
focused on maintaining a leaner, trained, and educated army with better technological
capabilities5.
Since the change in the British Gurkha education requirement was instigated by a
broader restructuring of the British Army, the timing of the change is unlikely to be
correlated to any social, economic, or political characteristics of Nepal at that time.
As a result, this change created an exogenous increase in educational returns abroad
for a subset of individuals in Nepal.
Shrestha (2011) finds that the change in the education requirement to join the
British Gurkha Army led Gurkha men to increase their education by an average of
1.24 years. It induced 19.5 percent of Gurkha men who would not have received
any formal education in the absence of the rule change, to enroll in school. Shrestha
(2011) shows that the impact of the rule change was significant among Gurkha men
of age 12 or younger in 1993, because they were likely to be enrolled in school at
the time of the rule change and also had su cient number of years to meet the new
educational requirement. Individuals who were 12 or younger in 1993 are referred to
as “age-eligible” for the remainder of this paper.
4The Eighth Defense Report published by the Defense Committee, House of Commons in 1997.
5The shift towards better-educated soldiers in 1990s was not unique to the British Army but
was also prevalent in the US Army. According to the Tenth Quadrennial Review of US Military
Compensation, the number of recruits with high school diploma increased by 30% in mid-1980s and
those who scored better than the median in the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) increased
by 10% in early 1990s
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2.3.3 Identification Strategy
The empirical analysis seeks to measure the inter-sibling e↵ect in education by
estimating the impact of age-eligible Gurkha men increasing their level of education
on Gurkha females living in the same household. Since the British Gurkha Army
recruitment is limited to Gurkha men, the education of Gurkha females would only
be a↵ected by the rule change through an increase in the education of their male sib-
lings. Hence, the exposure to the rule change among females is jointly determined by
ethnicity and whether they have any age-eligible male sibling living in the household.
The e↵ect is identified via di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimation, comparing the ed-
ucational attainment between females who have age-eligible male sibling and who
do not have age-eligible male sibling, across Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic groups.
The identification assumption is that in the absence of the rule change in 1993, the
di↵erence in female education between Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic groups would
have been identical across households with and without age-eligible men.
The simple comparison of education between Gurkha and non-Gurkha females
with age-eligible male sibling is likely to be driven by unobserved ethnic characteris-
tics. The di↵-in-di↵ strategy controls for the unobserved ethnic characteristics that
could a↵ect education as well as controls for the unobserved household characteristics
that could be correlated with fertility and education. Hence, the di↵-in-di↵ estimate
could be interpreted as the causal e↵ect of an increase in the education of age-eligible
Gurkha men, triggered by the exogenous change in the educational requirement to
join the British Gurkha Army, on the education of Gurkha females living in the
household.
























is the outcome of interest for woman i of ethnicity m in household
h and age k; ↵
1k
is an age dummy for each k;  
1m
is an ethnicity dummy for each
m; ⌘
1l
is a district of birth dummy for each l; G
im
is a dummy indicating whether
individual belongs to the Gurkha ethnic group; T
i
is a dummy indicating whether
the individual has any “age-eligible” male sibling; R
h
is a vector of household-specific
variables; and K
l
is a vector of individual characteristics. The coe cient   estimates
the inter-sibling e↵ect.
The di↵-in-di↵ estimate could be biased if unobserved characteristics that are
correlated with education and fertility di↵er systematically across Gurkha and non-
Gurkha ethnic groups. Shrestha (2011) show that Gurkha men of only specific age,
i.e. age-eligible Gurkha men, were a↵ected by the rule change. Hence, the paper
employs a di↵-in-di↵-in-di↵ strategy by utilizing the specific age of the male sibling
as a third dimension that determines the exposure to the rule change. This involves
subtracting the di↵-in-di↵ estimate, calculated from Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic
groups across females with no male siblings and females with any male siblings (age-
eligible and age-ineligible), from the di↵erence in education between Gurkha and
non-Gurkha females with age-eligible male sibling.









































is a dummy indicating whether the individual i has any male sibling
of any age (age-eligible or age-ineligible) living in the household h.
The coe cient   estimates the net e↵ect of an increase in the child’s education on
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the education of other children living in the household, which is jointly determined by
numerous o↵-setting mechanisms. On one hand, an increase in the child’s education
shifts resources away from the education of other children in the household. It also
limits the child’s ability to participate in the labor market which decreases the current
income of the household. On the other hand, it has a positive impact by decreasing
the per child fixed cost of education, by increasing the permanent income of the
household, and by decreasing the marginal benefit of leisure for other children.
2.4 Data
The paper uses the data from 2001 Census of Nepal. The empirical analysis
focuses on females who were 6 years old to 12 years old in 2001. The census data
are supplemented with 1996 Nepal Living Standards Surveys (NLSS), which is a
household sample survey with greater detail. Table 2.1 presents summary statistics
for the 235,297 girls from the 2001 Census as well as the 3,373 households from the
1996 NLSS.
Individual and household level averages for some socio-economic characteristics
are provided for the entire sample as well as separately for the Gurkha and non-
Gurkha ethnic groups. The Gurkha ethnic group comprises of just under 20 percent
of the samples in both surveys. Panel A shows that the average level of education
for the Gurkha ethnic group is 1.53, which is slightly lower than the average for the
non-Gurkha ethnic group of 1.59. Similarly, 79.3% of Gurkha girls were born in rural
area compared to 64% of non-Gurkha girls. 65% of Gurkha girls have age-eligible
male sibling compared to 65.7% of non-Gurkha girls. The average household size
for Gurkha and no-Gurkha ethnic groups are 6.16 and 6.30 respectively. Panel B
suggests that near the time of the rule change, non-Gurkha households had better
access to school facilities, health clinics, and transportation than Gurkha households.




The di↵-in-di↵ strategy compares the educational attainment of females who have
at least one age-eligible male sibling in the household to those who do not have
any age-eligible male sibling, in both Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic groups. Table
2.2 shows average years of education completed as of 2001 for females of age 6 to
12 in 2001.The empirical analysis focuses on girls 6 to 12 years old for three main
reasons. First, they are of similar age compared to men who were a↵ected by the rule
change, and as a result are most likely to complete with age-eligible men for household
resources including human capital investment. Second, they are old enough to have
the opportunity to enroll in school by 2001 and have data on education. Third, they
are young enough to be not married in 2001 and hence, have information on male
siblings who grew up with them6.
The results in table 2.2 show that an average education for Gurkha girls with
age-eligible male sibling is 1.62 years, which is less compared to non-Gurkha girls
with age-eligible male sibling whose average education is 1.72 years. This di↵erence
of 0.09 years is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. On the other hand,
among girls with no age-eligible male sibling7, there is no statistical di↵erence in the
average education across Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic groups. This suggests that
in the absence of the rule change, the female educational attainment would not have
di↵ered across Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic groups, even among girls with age-
eligible male siblings. The simple di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimation shows that girls
6The information on male siblings is obtained from the household roster. As a result, if a women
gets married and moves into a new household with her spouse before 2001, then the household roster
only provides information of the members living with her in 2001 but not the members who she grew
up with before she got married. Among girls of age 6 to 12 in 2001, 0.7% are married and as a
result, are dropped from the empirical analysis.
7The sample of girls with no age-eligible male sibling includes females who have no male sibling
or who have only age-ineligible male siblings.
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of Gurkha ethnic group with at least one age-eligible male sibling completed 0.11 less
years of education. This is significantly di↵erent from zero at the 1% level.
Table 2.3 presents the di↵erence-in-di↵erence strategy by estimating coe cient  
in equation (2.1) for dependent variable– years of education completed as of 2001.
The specification in column 1 does not control for any individual and household char-
acteristics and hence, the di↵-in-di↵ estimate is identical to the estimate of table 2.2.
The specification in column 2, on the other hand, controls for cohort of birth dummies
and ethnicity dummies because the di↵erence in age distribution and ethnicity com-
position of girls with and without age-eligible male siblings, might not be consistent
across Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic groups. The estimates in column 2 suggest
that education of Gurkha girls with age-eligible male siblings decreased by 0.09 years,
which implies a decrease of 6% from a mean education of 1.56 years. The estimate is
statistically significant at the 1% level.
Figure 2.1 shows that Gurkha ethnic group is concentrated in the mid-north and
north-east districts of Nepal. Table 2.1, panel A suggests that girls from Gurkha
ethnic groups are less likely to be born in an urban region than non-Gurkha girls.
Since the regional characteristics could be correlated with fertility and education,
the specification in columns 3, 4, 5, and 6 includes district of birth dummies and a
dummy indicating whether a girl was born in a rural region. The estimate in column
3 do not change and remains statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 2.1 also suggests that among girls who have at least one age-eligible male
sibling, Gurkha girls are likely to have slightly more number of age-eligible male
siblings than non-Gurkha girls. The unobserved characteristics that are correlated
with fertility and education could be di↵erent across Gurkha and non-Gurkha ethnic
groups. The specification in columns 4, 5, and 6 controls for the household size, the
number of age-eligible male siblings, and the number of male siblings of any age;
whereas the specification in columns 5 and 6 additionally controls for age spacing
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between the girl and her age-eligible male sibling as well as age gap between her and
her male sibling of any age. The results in columns 4 and 5 suggest that having any
age-eligible men in the household decreased Gurkha girls education by 0.09 years.
This implies that an increase in educational returns for age-eligible Gurkha men
reduced Gurkha girls education by 6%, from an average education of 1.56 years of
completed schooling in 2001.
The specification in column 6 corrects for other ethnic characteristics, such as
access to school, access to healthcare, and poverty. These ethnic-level characteristics
are obtained from 1996 NLSS. The estimates in column 6 are also statistically signif-
icant at the 1% level and suggest that an exogenous increase in the the educational
returns of age-eligible Gurkha men decreased education of Gurkha girls living in the
same household by 0.08 years.
The above interpretation is based on the assumption in the absence of the rule
change, the di↵erence in education between Gurkha and non-Gurkha girls would
have been identical across households with and without age-eligible men. The results
in table 2.1, however, suggest that unobserved ethnic characteristics could be jointly
correlated with fertility and education. Table 2.4 corrects for these unobserved ethnic
characteristics by employing a di↵-in-di↵-in-di↵ strategy and estimating coe cient  
in equation (2.2).
Table 2.4 presents the estimates for two dependent variables and 6 di↵erent spec-
ifications similar to table 2.3. The estimates in all the columns of table 2.4 do not
change considerably compared to the estimates in table 2.3 and are statistically sig-
nificant at the conventional levels. The results in column 5 suggest that an increase in
educational returns for age-eligible Gurkha men decreased the education of Gurkha
girls with age-eligible male sibling by 0.11 years. The results indicate that an inter-
sibling e↵ect of human capital investment is likely to be negative.
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2.6 Robustness
The validity of the empirical strategy relies on the assumption that fertility is
una↵ected by the change in educational requirement. Since fertility is measured
through household roster, the interpretation of the above results as an inter-sibling
e↵ect of education requires that the change in the educational requirement of the
British Gurkha Army in 1993 did not a↵ect the number of individuals, especially
male siblings, living together in the household among Gurkha ethnic group.
The change in the British Gurkha Army education requirement in 1993 could
induce age-eligible or age-ineligible Gurkha men to leave the household. The data on
number of male siblings living separately from the household is available for a subset
of girls used in the empirical analysis. The subsample for whom the information
regarding the number of male siblings living separately is available, includes 97.5%
of Gurkha girls and 96.2% of non-Gurkha girls from the original sample.
Table 2.5 and table 2.6 estimates coe cient   in equation (2.1) and (2.2) respec-
tively for this subsample. In both tables, specification in columns 2, 5, and 6 includes
a dummy indicating whether the girl has a male sibling living separately from the
household. The results in table 2.5 and 2.6 indicate that controlling for male siblings
who are not part of the household in 2001 does not change the estimates in any of the
specifications. More importantly, the estimates in columns 2, 4, and 6 in table 2.5
and 2.6 are all statistically significant at the conventional level. This suggests that
the results in table 2.3 and 2.4 can not be explained thought the changes in house-
hold structure of Gurkha ethnic group, mainly the departure of male siblings from
the household triggered by the rule change in 1993, but are more likely to be driven
by the intra-household sibling interactions induced by the increase in educational
attainment among age-eligible male siblings living in the household.
The departure of male siblings from the household also implies that they are not
counted as the girl’s male siblings in the empirical analysis. If unobserved ethnic
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characteristics are correlated with education and the likelihood of having all age-
eligible male siblings living separately, then the above results are likely to be biased.
Table 2.7 compares the household composition between Gurkha and non-Gurkha
ethnic groups. The results in table 2.7 show that both Gurkha and non-Gurkha
girls are equally likely to have at least one age-eligible male sibling living in the
household, suggesting the absence of di↵erential household formation across the two
ethnic groups. Moreover, figure 2.2 suggests that age-eligible male siblings, who are
20 years old or younger in 2001, are too young to live separately from their parents.
According to figure 2.2, only 1.94% of Gurkha households are headed by men of age
20 or younger and 2.24% of non-Gurkha households are headed by age-eligible men.
Table 2.8 employs an alternate strategy to assess household formation bias. Columns
1 and 2 presents the triple di↵erence estimates from table 2.6, columns 1 and 3 re-
spectively. The specification in columns 3 and 4 assumes that all the male siblings
living separately in 2001 belong to the age-ineligible cohort and more importantly,
they would have lived in the same household as the girl in the absence of the rule
change. The results in columns 3 and 4 suggest that including male siblings living
separately as age-ineligible male siblings living in the household for all girls in the
subsample, does not change the estimates compared to columns 1 and 2. Similarly,
the specification in columns 5 and 6 assumes that all the male siblings living sep-
arately in 2001 belong to the age-eligible cohort and would have lived in the same
household as the girl if not for the rule change. Under this assumption, the estimates
in columns 5 and 6 of inter-sibling e↵ect does not di↵er from the estimates in columns
1 and 2 and are also statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the
negative results in table 2.3 and 2.4 are not likely to be driven by di↵erential attrition
of male siblings from the household.
Finally, the paper employs a placebo study to examine whether the results could
be explained by unobserved ethnic characteristics that are correlated with education
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and the likelihood of having any age-eligible siblings. Table 2.9 estimates   in equation
(2.2) but instead of comparing educational attainment of girls based on whether have
have any age-eligible male siblings, it compares girls’ education based on whether
they have any age-eligible female siblings. Since age-eligible female siblings were not
a↵ected by the change in education requirement of the British Gurkha Army, the
estimate of inter-sibling e↵ect should be zero. The results in table 2.9 show that all
of the estimates are statistically insignificant at the 5% level. Although the high rate
of marriage attrition among age-eligible female siblings could biased these estimates,
the results do not refute the validity of the identification assumption and further
supports the claim that the results in table 2.3 and 2.4 are driven by the increase in
education of age-eligible Gurkha men living in the household.
2.7 Mechanisms
The above results estimate the net e↵ect of increasing age-eligible Gurkha men’s
education on the education of girls living in the household, which is jointly governed
by numerous o↵-setting intra-household mechanisms. Some negative mechanisms
identified by the theoretical models include the shifting of household resources away
from the human capital investment of girls and the decrease in current household
income due to a decease in labor supply of age-eligible Gurkha men. The positive
mechanisms involve lowering the girl’s share of the fixed costs of education, increasing
the permanent household income, and decreasing the girl’s marginal benefit of leisure.
Table 2.10 seeks to identify the increased competition of household resources
among its members due to an increase in age-eligible Gurkha men’s education. Stan-
dard household models suggest that an increase in educational returns for age-eligible
Gurkha men leads to a greater investment in their education, using resources that
could have been previously devoted to education of Gurkha girls in the household.
These models suggest that the competition among resources, including human capital
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investment, is decreasing with greater child spacing. Table 2.10 estimates   in equa-
tion (2.2) for Gurkha girls separately across age di↵erence between them and their
age-eligible male siblings.
The results in table 2.10 suggest that the estimates of the inter-sibling e↵ect
become less negative as the child spacing between the Gurkha girl and her age-eligible
male sibling increases. According to column 3, the education of Gurkha girls with
age-eligible male sibling who is not more than 1 year older or 1 year younger than
the girl, decreased by 0.19 years and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. On
the other hand, the education of Gurkha girls with age-eligible male sibling who is at
least 8 years older than the girl, decreased by only 0.05 years and it is not statistically
significant even at the 10% level. The F test in column 3 shows that the estimates
of the inter-sibling e↵ect across di↵erent child spacings are statistically di↵erent from
one another at the 5% level.
Table 2.11 identifies the inter-sibling e↵ect for Gurkha girls across di↵erent num-
ber of age-eligible Gurkha male siblings. The results from column 3 show that the
education for Gurkha girls with exactly one age-eligible male sibling decreased by
0.10 years, whereas, the education for Gurkha girls with more than 4 age-eligible
male siblings in the household decreased by 0.35 years. More importantly, the es-
timated negative e↵ect of the inter-sibling interaction is more severe as the number
of age-eligible male siblings in the household increases and the F test in column 3
suggests that these estimates are statistically di↵erent from one another at the 1%
level. The result in table 2.11 could be explained partly through the greater resource
competition among household members with larger number of age-eligible male sib-
lings and partly because of larger decrease in household income as more number of
age-eligible male siblings shift out of household enterprise towards schooling.
The e↵ect of decreasing age-eligible male sibling’s labor market participation on
the household income and in turn, on the girl’s education is further highlighted by
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the results in table 2.12. Table 2.12 examines the di↵erential inter-sibling interaction
in the education of Gurkha girls based on various socio-economic characteristics, in-
cluding access to schooling and operation of household agricultural enterprise. Since
most of the child labor are limited to household agricultural production, this implies
that households that operate agricultural production experience a greater reduction
in household income as age-eligible Gurkha men devote more of their time on school-
ing and away from household activities. The results in columns 6 and 7 indicate that
education of Gurkha girls with at least one age-eligible male siblings living in the
household that operates agricultural enterprise decreased by 0.12 years and statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level; whereas, for those living in the household that are
not involved in agricultural production decreased by only 0.07 years, which is not
statistically significant at the 10% level. The F stat, however, suggests that these two
estimates are not statistically di↵erent from one another at the conventional level.
The results in table 2.12 also show that the estimated inter-sibling e↵ect is less
negative for households that are in the districts with remote access to school, measured
in terms of average distance-time between the household and the school. Although
the estimates in column 4 and 5 are not statistically di↵erent from one another at
the 10% level, it does suggests that the ability to spread fixed cost of transport
across multiple siblings (including girls) moderates the negative e↵ect of having an
age-eligible brother, but does not overturn it8.
2.8 Conclusion
Education has been the focal point of development policies for the past few
decades. Economist and policymakers alike have devoted significant resources on
8Although the fixed cost of schooling has multi-facets, the empirical analysis is focused on only
one aspect of the fixed cost, i.e. time it takes to drop and pick up children to and from school. The
districts with more remote access to school indicates a large fixed cost of sending children to school
as parents have to devote more time transporting their children to school.
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understanding and evaluating household’s response to various educational policy in-
terventions. Since households are the key decision makers of their children’s educa-
tional outcomes, it is important to investigate these educational policies in the context
of household decision-making process.
Although theoretical household behavior models highlight the interactions among
household members regarding various socio-economic decisions, including human cap-
ital investment, the empirical estimation of how the education of one child a↵ects the
education of other children living in the household is absent due to endogeneity con-
cerns. The paper utilized a unique natural experiment involving an increase in the
educational requirement to join the British Gurkha Army for age eligible Gurkha
men, to estimate the e↵ect on the education of Gurkha girls living in the same house-
hold as them. Although the triple di↵erence estimation suggests a robust negative
inter-sibling e↵ect, the result should be considered carefully given the unique nature
of the British Gurkha recruitment, which is unlike any other labor markets or policy
interventions.
The paper sought to identify some of the o↵-setting mechanisms that govern the
inter-sibling interaction in education, including resource competition among its mem-
bers, changes in household income, and sharing of the fixed cost of schooling. How-
ever, a more suitable natural experiment or a well-designed randomized control trial
is required to precisely estimate the magnitudes of each of these mechanisms that
jointly determine the inter-sibling e↵ect in education.
The paper highlights the importance of inter-sibling interactions in determining
the socio-economic outcomes of its household members. It suggests a need to under-
stand these interactions not only in educational outcomes but also other important
variables such as health, nutrition, marriage, fertility, migration, and occupational
choice. Analyzing these socio-economic decisions as a culmination of interactions be-
tween household members’ preferences, choices, and resources, would not only help
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properly evaluate existing policy interventions but also help formulate more e↵ective
future policies.
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Figure 2.1: Map of Nepal with Concentration of Gurkha Ethnic Population and
Gurkha Recruitment Centers
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Whole Sample Gurkha Non-Gurkha
Panel A: Individual Level Means
2001 Census of Nepal
Total Sample 235,297 44,250 191,047
% of sample – 18.8% 81.2%
Level of Education 1.58 1.53 1.59
Percent Born in Rural 66.9% 79.3% 64.0%
Percent Married 0.7% 0.2% 0.8%
Age in 2001 8.97 8.99 8.97
Household Size 6.27 6.16 6.30
Number of Brothers 1.11 1.11 1.10
Number of Treated Brothers 1.00 1.01 1.00
Percent having Brother(s) 68.4% 67.6% 68.6%
Percent having Treated Brother(s) 65.6% 65.0% 65.7%
Percent Owning Land 75.5% 82.4% 73.8%
Percent Owning Livestock 72.0% 80.6% 70.0%
Panel B: Household Level Means
1996 NLSS
Total Sample 3373 544 2829
% of Sample – 16.1% 83.9%
Access to School 0.38 Hrs 0.54 Hrs 0.35 Hrs
Access to Health Post 1.20 Hrs 1.85 Hrs 1.07 Hrs
Access to Paved Road 9.30 Hrs 14.45 Hrs 8.30 Hrs
Annual Consumption $151.21 $149.93 $151.45
Percent of Household in Poverty 33.5% 48.5% 46.9%
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Table 2.2: Means of Education by Ethnicity and Age-Eligible Brother
Years of Education Completeda
Gurkha Non-Gurkha Di↵erence
Age-Eligible Brother 1.62 1.72 -0.09
(0 .010) (0.005) (0.012)
No Age-Eligible Brother 1.38 1.37 0.02
(0.012) (0.006) (0.014)
Di↵erence 0.24 0.35 -0.11
(0.016) (0.008) (0.019)
Notes: Sample includes females aged 6 to 12 in 2001. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
aHighest level of education completed as of 2001 based on 2001
Census of Nepal
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
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Table 2.3: E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of Gurkha Girls
with Age-Eligible Brother (Di↵erence-in-Di↵erence)
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of Education -0.11** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.08**
(0.053) (0.035) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.037)
No. of Obs 231,777 231,777 229,915 229,915 229,915 225,388
Control Variables:
Age Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of Birth Fixed E↵ects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rural No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Size No No No Yes Yes Yes
No. of Brothersa No No No Yes Yes Yes
No. of Age-Eligible Brothersb No No No Yes Yes Yes
Brother Age Di↵ Dummiesc No No No No Yes Yes
Age-Eligible Brother Age Di↵ Dummiesd No No No No Yes Yes
Access to Schoole No No No No No Yes
Access to Healthf No No No No No Yes
Povertyg No No No No No Yes
Notes: Sample includes females of age 6 to 12 in 2001. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Standard errors are adjusted for within-caste correlation.
a No. of Brothers is a variable indicating the number of brothers living in the household.
b No. of Age-Eligible Brothers is a variable indicating the number of treated males living in the
household.
c Brother Age Di↵ Dummies are dummies indicating the age di↵erence between the individual
and her closest brother.
d Age Eligible Brother Age Di↵ Dummies are dummies indicating the age di↵erence between
the individual and her closest treated brother.
eAccess to School is district-level average distance-time to school in 1996 calculated using 1996
NLSS
fAccess to Health is district-level average distance-time to health post in 1996 calculated using
1996 NLSS
gPoverty is district-level average household consumption in 1996 calculated using 1996 NLSS
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
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Table 2.4: E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of Gurkha Girls
with Age-Eligible Brother (Di↵erence-in-Di↵erence-in-Di↵erence)
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of Education -0.23** -0.14** -0.11* -0.11* -0.11* -0.12**
(0.080) (0.063) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.062)
No. of Obs 231,777 231,777 229,915 229,915 229,915 225,388
Control Variables:
Age Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of Birth Fixed E↵ects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rural No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Size No No No Yes Yes Yes
No. of Brothersa No No No Yes Yes Yes
No. of Age-Eligible Brothersb No No No Yes Yes Yes
Brother Age Di↵ Dummiesc No No No No Yes Yes
Age-Eligible Brother Age Di↵ Dummiesd No No No No Yes Yes
Access to Schoole No No No No No Yes
Access to Healthf No No No No No Yes
Povertyg No No No No No Yes
Notes: Sample includes females of age 6 to 12 in 2001. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Standard errors are adjusted for within-caste correlation.
a No. of Brothers is a variable indicating the number of brothers living in the household.
b No. of Age-Eligible Brothers is a variable indicating the number of treated males living in the
household.
c Brother Age Di↵ Dummies are dummies indicating the age di↵erence between the individual
and her closest brother.
d Age Eligible Brother Age Di↵ Dummies are dummies indicating the age di↵erence between
the individual and her closest treated brother.
eAccess to School is district-level average distance-time to school in 1996 calculated using 1996
NLSS
fAccess to Health is district-level average distance-time to health post in 1996 calculated using
1996 NLSS
gPoverty is district-level average household consumption in 1996 calculated using 1996 NLSS
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
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Table 2.5: E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of Gurkha Girls
with Age-Eligible Brother Controlling for Separated Brother (Di↵erence-
in-Di↵erence)
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of Education -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09**
Obs: 226,075 (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
Control Variablesa:
Separate Brother b No Yes No Yes No Yes
Household Size No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Brothersc No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Age-Eligible Brothersd No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brother Age Di↵ Dummiesc No No No No Yes Yes
Age-Eligible Brother Age Di↵ Dummiesd No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Sample includes females of age 6 to 12 in 2001 for whom data on number of brothers living
separately from the household are available. The data is available for females whose parents or
grandparents are heads of the household. It comprises of 96% of the sample. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for within-correlation.
aAll specifications include age fixed e↵ects, ethnicity fixed e↵ects, district of birth fixed e↵ects, and
rural dummy.
b Separate Brother is a dummy indicating whether the individual has brother(s) living separately.
c No. of Brothers is a variable indicating the number of brothers living in the household.
d No. of Age-Eligible Brothers is a variable indicating the number of treated males living in the
household.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
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Table 2.6: E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of Gurkha Girls
with Age-Eligible Brother Controlling for Separated Brother (Di↵erence-
in-Di↵erence-in-Di↵erence)
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of Education -0.21** -0.21** -0.21** -0.21** -0.20** -0.20**
Obs: 226,075 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067)
Control Variablesa:
Separate Brother b No Yes No Yes No Yes
Household Size No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Brothersc No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Age-Eligible Brothersd No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brother Age Di↵ Dummiesc No No No No Yes Yes
Age-Eligible Brother Age Di↵ Dummiesd No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Sample includes females of age 6 to 12 in 2001 for whom data on number of brothers living
separately from the household are available. The data is available for females whose parents or
grandparents are heads of the household. It comprises of 96% of the sample. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for within caste-correlation.
aAll specifications include age fixed e↵ects, ethnicity fixed e↵ects, district of birth fixed e↵ects, and
rural dummy.
b Separate Brother is a dummy indicating whether the individual has brother(s) living separately.
c No. of Brothers is a variable indicating the number of brothers living in the household.
d No. of Age-Eligible Brothers is a variable indicating the number of treated males living in the
household.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
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Table 2.7: E↵ect of the Rule Change on the Probability of Having Age-Eligible
Brother (Using Linear Probability Model)
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dummy Indicating -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Age-Eligible Brother(s) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
No. of Obs 231,777 231,777 231,777 231,777 227,213
Control Variables:
Age Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of Birth Fixed E↵ects No No Yes Yes Yes
Rural No No No Yes Yes
Access to School No No No No Yes
Access to Health No No No No Yes
Poverty No No No No Yes
Notes: Sample includes females of age 6 to 12 in 2001. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for within-caste
correlation.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
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Table 2.8: E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of Gurkha Girls
with Age-Eligible Brother (Lee Bounds)
All Separate Brothers All Separate Brothers
Baseline Age Ineligiblea Age-Eligibleb
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of Education -0.21** -0.21** -0.20** -0.22** -0.21** -0.22**
(0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.065)
Control Variablesc:
Household Size No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Brothersd No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Elig Brotherse No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Sample includes females of age 6 to 12 in 2001 for whom data on number of brothers living
separately from the household are available. The data is available for females whose parents or
grandparents are heads of the household. It comprises of 96% of the sample. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for within-caste correlation.
cAll specifications include age fixed e↵ects, ethnicity fixed e↵ects, district of birth fixed e↵ects, and
rural dummy.
d No. of Brothers is a variable indicating the number of brothers living in the household.
e No. of Age-Eligible Brothers is a variable indicating the number of treated males living in the
household.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
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Table 2.9: E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of Gurkha Girls
with Age-Eligible Sister (Falsification Test)
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of Education 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.21 0.13
(0.145) (0.104) (0.085) (0.086) (0.138) (0.136)
No. of Obs 231,777 231,777 229,915 229,915 227,515 223,018
Control Variables:
Age Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of Birth Fixed E↵ects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rural No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Size No No No Yes Yes Yes
No. of Sistersa No No No Yes Yes Yes
No. of Age-Eligible Sistersb No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sister Age Di↵ Dummiesc No No No No Yes Yes
Age-Eligible Sister Age Di↵ Dummiesd No No No No Yes Yes
Access to Schoole No No No No No Yes
Access to Healthf No No No No No Yes
Povertyg No No No No No Yes
Notes: Sample includes females of age 6 to 12 in 2001. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Standard errors are adjusted for within-caste correlation.
a No. of Sisters is a variable indicating the number of female siblings living in the household.
b No. of Age-Eligible Sisters is a variable indicating the number of age-eligible (12 or younger
in 1993) female siblings living in the household.
c Sister Age Di↵ Dummies are dummies indicating the age di↵erence between the individual and
her closest female sibling.
d Age Eligible Sister Age Di↵ Dummies are dummies indicating the age di↵erence between the
individual and her closest age-eligible female sibling.
eAccess to School is district-level average distance-time to school in 1996 calculated using 1996
NLSS
fAccess to Health is district-level average distance-time to health post in 1996 calculated using
1996 NLSS
gPoverty is district-level average household consumption in 1996 calculated using 1996 NLSS
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
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Table 2.10: Di↵erential E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of
Gurkha Girls with Age-Eligible Brother (By Age Di↵erence)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0  AgeDiff  1 -0.27** -0.22** -0.19** -0.18** -0.17** -0.20**
(0.083) (0.075) (0.075) (0.071) (0.073) (0.076)
2  AgeDiff  3 -0.24** -0.15** -0.12** -0.11* -0.11* -0.12**
(0.082) (0.058) (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
4  AgeDiff  5 -0.23** -0.13* -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11
(0.090) (0.068) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) (0.065)
6  AgeDiff  7 -0.25** -0.15* -0.13* -0.12* -0.12* -0.14**
(0.080) (0.074) (0.073) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071)
8  AgeDiff  14 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07
(0.113) (0.098) (0.093) (0.091) (0.091) (0.094)
Prob   F(All Coe cients Equal) 0.412 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
Control Variables:
Treated Brother Age Di↵ Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of Birth Fixed E↵ects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rural No No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Size No No No No Yes Yes
No. of Brothers No No No No Yes Yes
No. of Treated Brothers No No No No Yes Yes
Access to School No No No No No Yes
Access to Health No No No No No Yes
Poverty No No No No No Yes
Notes: Sample includes females of age 6 to 12 in 2001. The dependent variable
is the years of education completed as of 2001. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for within-caste correlation.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
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Table 2.11: Di↵erential E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment
of Gurkha Girls with Age-Eligible Brother (By Number of Age-Eligible
Brothers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No. of Treated Brother = 1 -0.22** -0.13* -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10*
(0.085) (0.064) (0.065) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062)
No. of Treated Brother = 2 -0.25** -0.15** -0.13** -0.12** -0.12** -0.14**
(0.076) (0.065) (0.063) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
No. of Treated Brother = 3 -0.16 -0.17* -0.16** -0.15* -0.15** -0.17**
(0.105) (0.091) (0.080) (0.076) (0.076) (0.079)
No. of Treated Brother   4 -0.28** -0.36** -0.35** -0.32** -0.32** -0.34**
(0.122) (0.101) (0.101) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096)
Prob   F(All Coe cients Equal) 0.105 0.006 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007
Control Variables:
No. of Treated Brother Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of Birth Fixed E↵ects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rural No No No Yes Yes Yes
Household Size No No No No Yes Yes
No. of Brothers No No No No Yes Yes
Access to School No No No No No Yes
Access to Health No No No No No Yes
Poverty No No No No No Yes
Notes: Sample includes females of age 6 to 12 in 2001. The dependent variable
is the years of education completed as of 2001. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for within-caste correlation.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
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Table 2.12: Di↵erential E↵ect of the Rule Change on Human Capital Investment of
Gurkha Girls with Age-Eligible Brother (By Density, Distance to School,
and Operation of Household Enterprise)
Whole Densitya Distance to Schoolb Household Enterprisec
Sample Rural Urban  Median   Median Ag Land No Ag Land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-0.12** -0.10 -0.21* -0.15* -0.07 -0.12* -0.07
(0.055) (0.064) (0.109) (0.083) (0.075) (0.062) (0.122)
231,777 155,362 76,415 129,734 102,043 152,472 74,741
Notes: Sample includes females of age 6 to 12 in 2001. The dependent variable is the years of
schooling completed as of 2001. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are
adjusted for within-caste correlation. All specifications include age fixed e↵ects, ethnicity fixed
e↵ects, district of birth fixed e↵ects, rural dummy, and household size.
a Density: Sample divided into two categories based on population density in the area of birth:
individuals born in rural area and urban area.
b Distance to School: Sample divided into two categories based on average distance-time to school
in 1996: individuals born in districts with average distance-time to school  median district-level
time and districts with average distance-time to school   median district-level time. The median
district-level distance-time to school is 0.36 hours.
c Household Enterprise: Sample divided into two categories based on ownership of agricultural
land and livestocks: individuals in household with agricultural land and livestocks and household with
no agricultural land and no livestocks.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
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CHAPTER III
Access to the North-South Roads and Farm
Profits in Rural Nepal
3.1 Introduction
Rural transportation is an important development strategy in low-income coun-
tries. It enhances economic gains for agrarian households by providing easier access
to both input and output markets. Moreover, such gains are likely to have a sub-
stantial impact on poverty reduction because the poor are concentrated in the rural
agricultural sector, where transportation infrastructure is most scarce.1
The World Bank in 2005 invested more than $8 billion US dollars on infrastruc-
ture in developing countries, which accounts for 35 percent of their total lending
(World Bank, 2006). But measuring economic benefits of these large investments
is di cult because of reverse causality. Although past economic growths are often
always accompanied by rapid expansion of infrastructure, such strong correlations
do not imply that investments on infrastructure will promote growth. On one hand,
comparing regions with various degrees of infrastructure could overestimate its e↵ect
on economic development because development in and of itself also increases demand
150 percent of the poor in Nepal live in rural areas and are involved in agricultural production.
Rural areas are often characterized by rugged terrain, sparse population, and isolation, thereby
making e↵ective transportation infrastructure for market integration even more crucial.
84
for infrastructure. On the other hand, given Burgess and Jedwab (2010) find that
political appointees considerably influence road allocation across region, if political
power and economic wealth are negatively correlated, this will bias the estimate of
the e↵ect of infrastructure towards zero. I overcome the endogeneity bias by utilizing
a unique geographic feature that exogenously determines the placement of road in
rural Nepal and estimate the impact on its agricultural economy.
Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world with a dominant agriculture
sector and a sparse road network due to an extremely rugged terrain. Based on 2001
Nepal census data, 44 percent of its population including 3.3 million poor live in the
hills, out of which 75 percent of them rely on agriculture for their livelihoods. The
rough terrain poses a serious challenge for road construction, which is reflected by
one of the lowest road densities in the world.2 Nevertheless, in the last four decades
the government constructed 15,308 kilometers of roads by relying significantly on
international donors, expanding from a meager length of 376 km in 1951.3
The main purpose of these roads is to connect district headquarters, which are
historical fort towns that currently serve as administrative centers. The govern-
ment’s 20-Year Road Plan in 2001 adopted five main objectives, the top of which
was “strengthening political and administrative linkages.” Shrestha (2001a) points
out that the economic consideration is always secondary to the administrative con-
sideration in constructing rural roads. More importantly, because all mountains in
the region span north-south, it is cheaper to construct a north-south road, which
follows one of such mountain ranges, relative to constructing an east-west road that
2In 2007, the road density in Nepal was 121 km/100 km2 or 0.8 km per 1,000 people. Only 43
percent of the rural population have access to all-season road and the average distance to the nearest
transportation stop in rural area is 30 kilometers. 60 percent have access to roads within two-hours
walking distance, while 23 percent are beyond a four-hour walk.
3According to the World Bank, Nepal’s road network annually increased by 6.7% between 1995
and 2004 with the largest expansion occurring in roads classified as district or rural roads, which
grew annually by 11% during this period. Based on the “Twenty Year Road Plan” published by
the Ministry of Physical Planning and Work, Department of Roads, the public road expenditure
accounted for 12 percent of the total national budget in 2001.
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has to cross multiple mountains via bridges.4 This unique geographic feature has
resulted in a road network that includes a single east-west highway that stretches
the entire country and multiple north-south roads, which connect to this highway at
various locations. Each north-south road connects several district headquarters that
are situated directly north of its junction with the east-west highway.
I use this geographic north-south corridors to construct an instrumental variable
to deal with the endogeneity issue of where the road is constructed. In particular, I
divide the country into 10 equal north-south blocks and connect all the district head-
quarters within each block with its nearest district headquarter by using a straight
line.5 Dividing the country into such north-south blocks ensures that the district
headquarters are connected along the north-south direction rather than east-west
direction, as suggested by the geographic feature of mountains. I also connect the
district headquarter that is closest to the east-west highway within each block to that
highway via a shortest distance, which results in 10 north-south lines connecting all
the district headquarters in the hills to the east-west highway. Although 10 north-
south blocks are based on the actual political and administrative division of Nepal,6 I
repeat the algorithm using 12 north-south blocks and show that the results are robust
to my choice of the algorithm parameter. Lastly, I show that the distance to these
straight lines is a strong predictor of household’s proximity to road. Moreover, the
construction of the straight lines are based on two factors, administrative integration
and geographic feature that favors north-south linkages, both of which are likely to
4In 2001, the cost of constructing two-lane bridge in the hill region was estimated to be half a
million rupees per meter. In the same year, the construction of bridges comprised of more than 30
percent of the total government funding on road development, and 15 percent of the total road in-
vestments based on the estimates from the Ministry of Finance. This illustrates that the construction
of bridges constitutes a significant cost burden on any road project’s total budget.
5As seen in figures 3.3 and 3.5, the following algorithm leads to some district headquarters being
connected to multiple other district headquarters because the nearest district headquarter pairs are
not symmetric i. e. the district headquarter that is nearest to another district headquarter does
not always imply that the later district headquarter is also the nearest district headquarter of the
former.
6Nepal is divided into 5 political and administrative regions, as shown in figure 3.4. The five
pairs of these adjoining north-south blocks coincide well with these 5 administrative regions.
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be independent of the socio-economic characteristics of households in the hinterlands.
My empirical method improves the identification strategies used by previous stud-
ies. While Banerjee et al. (2009) and Atack et al. (2009) construct a straight line
connecting important historical cities to predict modern railway network, their in-
struments coincide with historical trade corridors and therefore could be correlated
with unobserved characteristics that are associated with living close to a historical
route. In contrast, I confine the linkage to a north-south direction making it less
likely to be correlated with historical trade routes, which stretch in both an east-west
and a north-south directions according to Stiller (1976).7 Jacoby and Minten (2008)
include transportation costs directly into a nonparametric model, while arguing that
the di↵erences in transportation costs are due to geographic terrain. The costs are
significantly higher at the top of the mountain relative to the bottom. However, ele-
vation could be correlated with land productivity as well as household’s unobserved
characteristics, especially if poor households are more likely to settle at higher ele-
vations due to cheaper access to those lands. Apart from the physical feature of the
terrain, my empirical strategy also relies on an administrative integration policy to
explain the variation in access to road, and therefore, allows for appropriate controls
of terrain quality such as elevation and land gradient.
Using cross-sectional household data from 2011 Nepal Living Standard Survey
and geo-spatial data from MENRIS, I estimate a 2SLS model to calculate the ef-
fect of roads on household profit from agriculture as measured by the farm value.
If farms behave like assets,8 the improvement in farm’s future profits due to lower
transportation cost should be reflected in its value. This approach is used by Arnott
and Stiglitz (1981) and Jacoby (2000) to circumvent the daunting task of calculating
7Based on Stiller (1976) and Shrestha (2001a), communications between district headquarters
were historically carried out through foot trails that stretched east-west as well as north-south by
connecting the district headquarters via a shortest distance, and they constituted the central nerve
of the hill economy prior to the construction of roads.
8The standard asset-pricing model states that the present value of a plot is equal to the discounted
sum of its future profits. This hypothesis is tested on rented farm plots later in the paper.
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actual farm profits. Household surveys in low-income countries lack accurate infor-
mation on farm profits, partly because many input purchases and sales of output are
conducted informally through non-monetary transfers.
My results suggest that decreasing a household’s travel time to the nearest road
by one percent increases its farm value by 0.25 percent. The 2SLS estimates are sta-
tistically significant at the 5 percent level and are robust to the algorithm parameters
used to construct the line. While earlier infrastructure studies like Michaels (2008)
and Donaldson (2010) focus on price convergence from the view point of trade frame-
work, I estimate household-specific economic gains from infrastructure investments.
Because most of the world’s poor inhabit rural areas and agriculture accounts for a
significant fraction of a rural economy, the results directly contribute towards the gov-
ernment’s goal to reduce poverty. Mansuri et al. (2012b) and Mansuri et al. (2012a)
find that farm productivity and commercialization are two important determinants of
escaping poverty in rural Pakistan and Uganda, both of which are likely to be directly
a↵ected by access to transportation (Fafchamps and Hill , 2005; Gollin and Rogerson,
2010). These results are consistent with my findings and together they highlight the
benefits of rural transportation investments on agriculture, poverty alleviation, and
food security.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the geographic
feature that influences road network in Nepal. Section 3 presents a theoretical model
that illustrates the benefits of road projects on farm profits. Section 4 explains the
identification used for causal estimation and Section 5 describes the data used for this
strategy. Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Background
Nepal is a landlocked country with isolated, localized economies referred to by
Shrestha and Jain (1977) as “pocket economies”. This fragmentation is a direct
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manifestation of its extremely rugged terrain, which has seriously undermined the
development of adequate communication and transportation infrastructure (Shrestha,
2004). 77 percent of its land surface is covered by mountains and hills, with an
exception of the Terrai plain in the south. The elevation in the hill region changes
sharply from only 80 meters above sea level to more than 8800 meters within a
stretch of just 100 kilometers, making road construction very di cult. As a result,
road density is only 14 km/100 km2 or 0.8 km per 1,000 people, which is one of the
lowest in the world (Meyer , 2008). Figure 3.1 illustrates the rough landscape that
covers almost the entire country.
Despite such rugged terrain, almost half of the population live in the hills where
poverty incidence of 35 percent is the highest among all the regions (NLSS, 2004).
According to Upadhyaya (2010), majority of these poor own small, fragmented land-
holdings and rely on subsistence farming for their livelihoods.9 Moreover, most of the
hill lands are steeply sloped, highly vulnerable to soil erosion, and impervious to irri-
gation, leading to an extremely low farm productivity (UNDP, 2002). These factors,
together with a poor access to input and output markets due to sparse road network,
severely restrict the economic gains from farming and worsen the food security prob-
lem in the region.10 Therefore, the government has emphasized the construction of
roads in the hill region as an important means to fight poverty.11
One of such infrastructure projects is the construction of the East West Highway
(EWH), which began in the late 1950s but was only completed in the early 2000s.
EWH spans the entire country along its southern border with India in the Terrai
plain, with the total length of 1024 kilometers. It is the longest and the most impor-
946 percent of the land owning households in the hills own less than 0.5 hectare of agricultural
land.
10Based on the estimates by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), more
than 48 percent of children under 5 years of age are malnourished in the rural areas of Nepal.
11The Government of Nepal’s Interim Three Year Plan (2007-2010) strongly emphasizes the role of
roads in reducing poverty in rural areas, by improving rural access and prompting higher agricultural
output as well as non-farm income in remote hill areas of the country.
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tant highway in Nepal. According to Shrestha (2004), it is the backbone of Nepal’s
road network and plays a significant role in fostering social, economic, and political
integration, by connecting all the major regional economies.
Although expanding the road network is an important government strategy for
poverty reduction, its chief purpose is geared towards administrative integration by
stressing the linkage between district headquarters. These are historical fort towns,
which are scattered throughout the hill tops, and were converted into administra-
tive centers under the current political system. According to Shrestha (2001a), the
economic consideration have and still remains secondary to the administrative consid-
eration in determining the construction of rural highways. The national transporta-
tion policy of the government states that “high priority shall be given to completing
north-south roads connecting all 75 district headquarters to the main highway.”
3.2.1 North-South Road
North-South (NS) roads are the most cost e↵ective way of connecting district
headquarters due to a geographic feature of the region, especially after the comple-
tion of EWH. All mountain ranges in the hill region span north-south followed by
deep and narrow valleys or rivers on either sides. Consequently, a rural road is con-
structed by following one of such mountains from north to south until the road joins
EWH in the Terrai plain. In contrast to constructing roads that stretch east-west,
NS roads cross fewer mountain ranges and therefore require fewer number of bridges,
which significantly reduces costs. Based on figures from the Finance Ministry, bridge
construction accounts for more than 30 percent of the government’s funding on road
projects and 15 percent of its total road expenditure, which suggests that building
a bridge constitutes a significant cost burden on a project’s budget. Therefore, dis-
trict headquarters are connected to the national road network via NS roads that all
feed into EWH. The Twenty Year Road Plan published by the Ministry of Physical
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Planning, emphasizes the construction of NS roads and highlights the government’s
reliance on NS roads to achieve its goal of administrative integration.
Transportation and communications between district headquarters were histor-
ically carried out through numerous foot trails that stretch east-west as well as
north-south, connecting the district headquarters via a shortest distance (Stiller ,
1976). Figure 3.2 shows all the foot trails that span across the country. According
to Shrestha (2001a), the network of walking paths across the hills consisted of rope
bridges, ferries, and other means of crossing between mountain ranges and prior to
EWH, they constituted the central nerve of the hill economy. This implies that the
recently constructed NS roads are likely to be uncorrelated with these foot trails that
formed the trade link between district headquarters in the past. More importantly,
the construction of NS roads in order to connect the district headquarters to EWH
led to an exogenous increase in access to road for villages in north-south hinterlands
relative to those in east-west hinterlands.
3.3 Theory
Farmers cultivate a single crop using two factors of production, x kg per hectare
of chemical fertilizer and l hours per hectare of labor. Using a fixed technology,
their crop yield y (kg per hectare) is given by the neoclassical production function
y = f ( x, l ). All farmers trade agricultural output and fertilizer in a competitive
market centers located at the juncture of a rural road and the main highway.12 The
transportation of goods between farms and their nearest market center involves two
components– head-loading goods between the farm and the road using human porters
and trucking goods along the road, the former constituting the majority share of the
12As explained in the earlier section, the road network in Nepal comprises of EWH, which runs
through the entire country, with various NS roads feeding into this main highway from the north at
various locations along its length.
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total transportation cost.13
From a given farm, it takes h hours to reach the nearest road junction and the
portage cost of goods is t Rupees/ (kg hours). If k and p be the prices of fertilizers
and outputs in the market center, respectively, then the e↵ective purchase price of
fertilizer is ek = k + th Rupees/kg and the e↵ective selling price of output is
ep = p   th Rupees/kg.14 Let w be the wage rate of agricultural work. The per
hectare land rent, r, can be defined as the maximal profit that can be earned from a
hectare of land,
r (w, ek, ep ) ⌘ max
l,x
( epy   wl   ekx ) (3.1)
Moreover, using the envelope theorem, the relationship between land rent and
travel time to the nearest road is given by:
d r(w,ek, ep)
d h
=  t(y + x) < 0 (3.2)
The above equation implies that an improved access to roads for farmers increases
their agricultural profit and therefore, raises the per hectare rent (r) of their plots.
The negative rent gradient is equal to the total portage cost per hour per hectare.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
While the theoretical analysis above is framed in terms of land rents that capture
the economic profits from cultivation, I use plot values in the empirical analysis
13This feature is likely to closely match the reality on the ground for most rural farmers in the
hills, where almost six million people or 23% of the population still live more than four hours’ walk
away from the closest road. The markets at intermediate points between the farms and the road are
an inessential complication because goods still need to be head-loaded from the road junction, the
cost of which will be reflected on their prices at these intermediate market centers.
14The price of goods, k and p, are assumed not to vary across the market centers along the main
highway (EWH). However, this assumption is relaxed in the empirical analysis with the inclusion of
district (regional) fixed e↵ects.
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instead.15 According to the standard asset-pricing model, the present value of a plot
is equal to the discounted sum of its future profits, given by
log (V ) = log [ r(w, ek, ep) ]   log (b) (3.3)
where V is the present market value and b is the constant discount rate. Although the
above equation provides a valuable link between observable land values and mostly
unobservable land rents, the relationship may not be valid in Nepal because of land
and credit markets distortions. If land is the sole form of collateral for loans, its price
could capture its collateral value on top of the discounted future revenue stream from
its rent (Chalamwong and Feder , 1988). Therefore, proving the validity of the asset
pricing model requires estimating the following regression




log(r) + " (3.4)
and testing whether the coe cient estimate v
1
= 1. If this condition holds, then
estimating the log-rent function of a plot is equivalent to estimating its log-value
function, up to a constant.
3.4.1 Instrumental Variable
The empirical strategy to overcome selection bias is based on the unique geo-
graphic feature of Nepal. As described in the section above, all mountain ranges
stretch north-south that results in a cheaper construction of roads that also run in
the same direction. I use this feature to predict the placement of rural roads and im-
plement an instrumental variable strategy to estimate the economic gains from better
15Nepal Living Standard Survey 2011, a nationally representative survey, collects detailed infor-
mation on each plot owned by the household, its soil and irrigation characteristics, and its market
value measured by the survey question, “If you wanted to buy/sell a plot exactly like this, how much
would it cost/fetch you? ”
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road accessibility for agrarian households living in the hills.
I take district headquarters that lie north of EWH and connect them using a
simple algorithm. First, I divide the country into 10 north-south blocks based on equal
longitudinal spacing. The five pairs of these adjoining blocks coincide well with the 5
development regions of Nepal,16 with each block embodying 6 district headquarters on
average. Within each block, I draw a straight line from each district headquarter to
the nearest other district headquarter. Some district headquarters could be connected
to multiple district headquarters because the nearest-headquarter pairs are not always
symmetric.17 Furthermore, restricting the connections to a north-south block ensures
that the district headquarters are connected in a north-south direction rather than
an east-west direction, which is an important feature of the instrumental variable
strategy. Lastly, I connect the district headquarter within each block that is closest
to EWH with EWH via a shortest straight line. The following algorithm results in 10
separate north-south linkages connecting the district headquarters to EWH. Figure
3.3 illustrates the 10 geographic blocks, the straight lines connecting the district
headquarters, and EWH; whereas, figure 3.4 shows the five development regions.
While 10 north-south blocks are based on the actual administrative division of Nepal,
figure 3.5 shows the outcome of a similar exercise, but using 12 geographic blocks
instead of 10 for alternate north-south linkages.
The straight line serves a proxy for NS road in the hill region. Whether the line
drawn this way coincides well with actual road network can be tested, by estimat-
ing the correlation between the distance to the line and distance to road using the
16Nepal is divided into 5 development regions: Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-Western, and
Far-Western regions, starting from east to west. Figure 3.4 maps these 5 development regions.
17Suppose there are three district headquarters A, B, and C. If A is the nearest district headquarter
to B and vice versa, whereas the nearest district headquarter to C is also A, then district headquarter
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where T
id
is the distance to the nearest road for rural household i living in district d,
D
id
is the distance to the nearest line, and ⌘
d
is district fixed e↵ects. More importantly,
D
id
is influenced by two factors– administrative need to connect district headquarters
and the geographic feature that favors north-south linkages. Both of them are likely
to be independent of the socio-economic conditions of communities in the hinterlands,
providing a plausibly exogenous variation in access to infrastructure for households
in these regions.
The use of log(D
id
) variable as an instrument to estimate the e↵ect of road on
farm profits requires satisfying the exclusion restriction. One potential concern in
this strategy is that D
id
could be picking household’s proximity to the district head-
quarter itself, which in turn, directly a↵ects farm profits and market land values.
To address this, I control for the distance to the nearest district headquarter as well
as the distance to EWH. Banerjee et al. (2009) point out that the distance to the
straight line joining two cities in China violates the exclusion restriction because it
also coincides with the historical trade routes between those cities. In contrast, the
historical routes connecting any two cities in Nepal are equally likely to stretch east-
west as well as north-south,18 while the line is restricted to a north-south direction.
Nevertheless I control for the distance to the nearest foot trails, which constitute the
main channel through which all trades were carried out between two cities before the
construction of highways as pointed out by Stiller (1976). Finally, D
id
could also be
correlated with the physical attributes of the agricultural land that directly a↵ect its
productivity and profits, I control for geographical characteristics such as distance to
river, elevation, and land gradient as well as productivity variables such as suitability
18See figure 3.2 for the mapping of historical trade routes across the country.
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for rice plantation (the main staple crop of the region) and irrigation. Therefore, the
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is a market value of plot p owned by household i living in district d; ⌘
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is a
district dummy for each d; Q
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is the distance to the nearest district headquarter for
household i in district d; R
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is the distance to the nearest river; M
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is a land gradient; A
pid
is a total area of plot p owned by household i
in hectares; X̄
pid
is a vector of plot level characteristics.
The excluded instrument from the land value equation i.e. equation (3.7) is the
log distance to the line. The e↵ect of road is identified by variation in the household’s
access to road due to its proximity to the north-south line connecting two district
headquarters. As discussed above, since the land value equation also includes distance
variables and plot characteristics, the instrument is likely to be uncorrelated with the
error term ". Under these conditions, the estimation of   in equation (3.7) using




The data for this study come from two major sources. The household information
on agriculture and access to infrastructure is obtained from the 2011 Nepal Living
Standards Survey (NLSS). It is a nationwide survey collected by the Central Bureau
of Statistics with a stratified random sample of 5988 households, out of which 2058
households reside in the rural hill region with farmland. The Survey includes detailed
agriculture module with information on all individual plots owned or leased by the
household, along with its area, quality, market value, irrigation, and the net rent
received by the household if the plot was leased out. Additionally, it collects infor-
mation on household’s access to various facilities, including the nearest paved road,
in terms of travel time. Travel time measures are more useful than actual distance
calculated using satellite telemetry because of mountainous terrain.
A unique feature of the 2011 NLSS is that it provides GIS information on the
location of its households. I use this GIS data to merge the Mountain Environment
and Natural Resources’ Information System (MENRIS) data for the NLSS sample
households. The MENRIS geospatial data is collected by the International Centre for
Integrated Mountain Development, ICIMOD, and has information on elevation, foot
trails, and river paths for the Hindu Kush Himalaya region including Nepal. I use
this to construct all the distance variables including the instrumental variable, and
terrain characteristics such as land gradient.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for rural households residing in the hills
that own a farmland along with their plot characteristics. An average landholdings
of a household is only 0.62 ha, with an average plot size of 0.19 ha. 30 percent of the
plots are categorized as being suitable for rice cultivation; whereas, almost 70 percent
of all plots do not have access to irrigation in any agriculture season.
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3.6 Results
The relationship between rent and market value of a plot, as described by the asset-
pricing model, can be established by estimating equation (3.4). Table 3.2 presents the
estimate of coe cient ⌘
1
in equation (3.4), by using 321 plots that were either rented
out in both agricultural seasons or in the wet season. These plots were rented mainly
through sharecropping and account for about 5 % of the total plots owned. Their net
rents are calculated by summing the rents across both seasons and including the value
of in-kind payments, while the costs of inputs provided by the tenants are deducted.
The mean rent to value ratio ( r
V
) is 0.055, which can be interpreted as an estimate
of the discount rate b.19
The OLS estimate of ⌘
1
in column 1 assumes that the log rent is uncorrelated with
the error term. Although the estimate is less that one, attenuation bias because of
random measurement error in rents could bias the estimate towards zero, as pointed
out by Jacoby (2000). Therefore, the specifications in columns 2 and 3 instrument
rents with plot area and column 3 additionally includes district fixed e↵ects. The
estimates, 1.12 and 1.08 respectively, are accurate and not statistically di↵erent from
unity even at the 10 % level, and therefore the validity of the asset pricing model
cannot be rejected.
Table 3.3 estimates of the impact of transportation infrastructure on the economic
gains from agriculture using a log-linear specification described by equation (3.7).
Because farmland behaves like an asset as proven by the results from table 3.2, higher
farm profits because of lower transportation costs should be capitalized in farmland
values. Therefore, the total economic benefits of having better road accessibility
for agrarian households can be calculated by estimating  , the coe cient of the log
travel time to road in equation (3.7), where the dependent variable is the log value
19Jacoby (2000) also finds the rent to value ratio among rented lands in Nepal using 1996 NLSS
to be 0.055.
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of farmlands. Only controlling for the size of farmland, the OLS estimate of   in
column 1 is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and its value of -0.19 implies
that that an increase in the travel time to the nearest road by 10 percent decreases
the value of the farmland by 1.9 percent. However, profitable plots may encourage
larger road investments or rural roads may be more abundant in relatively more
productive regions. The inclusion of plot characteristics in columns 2 and 3, and
district fixed e↵ects in column 3, ameliorates the endogeneity problem as long as the
location of roads are determined by observed plot characteristics or by unobserved
characteristics of the district and not by unobserved characteristics of the specific
plots within the district. While the estimate in column 3 implies a strong positive
e↵ect of road on farm value, nevertheless, unobserved socio-economic and political
factors may influence road allocation within the district, which could bias the above
OLS estimates in either direction and necessitate the use of an instrumental variable
strategy to overcome the potential endogeneity bias.
Table 3.4 estimates the correlation between the travel time to the nearest road
and the distance to the nearest line by using equation (3.5). The sample is restricted
to 2058 households living in the rural hills, for which this strategy is most relevant.
Panel A presents estimates that use the line constructed based on the algorithm which
divides the region into 10 blocks; whereas, the estimates using the line constructed
with 12 blocks are shown in Panel B. All the estimates are positive and significant
at the 1 percent level, even after controlling for district fixed e↵ects in column 2 and
additionally for the distance to the nearest district HQ and the distance to EWH in
column 3.
This strong correlation suggests the possibility of using this variable as an instru-
ment in a 2SLS model described by equations (3.6) and (3.7), to estimate the e↵ect
of better access to road on land value. The threat to the validity of such a model
arises from the potential correlation of the instrumental variable with (1) proximity
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to district headquarter, (2) closeness to the historical trade corridors, and (3) physical
characteristics of the plot. However, NLSS and MENRIS datasets have a wide set of
household and plot level information that can be used to construct these variables,
which are then included in equations (3.6) and (3.7). The measures of plot charac-
teristics include the distance to river, land gradient, elevation, a dummy indicating
whether the plot is suitable for rice cultivation, dummies indicating year round or
seasonal irrigation, and dummies indicating types of irrigation. The distance to foot
trails picks up unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the proximity to
historical trading routes; whereas the distance to the nearest district headquarter and
the distance to EWH variables control for the proximity to district headquarter and
EWH respectively.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 estimate the reduced form e↵ect of the distance to the line
constructed by using 10 and 12 blocks algorithms, respectively. The specification in
column 1 in both tables only includes controls for district fixed e↵ects, farm size, and
the proximity to the nearest district headquarter and EWH. According to table 3.5
column 1, an increase in the distance to the line by 10 percent decreases the value of
land by 0.34 percent. As discussed above, the distance to the line could be correlated
with proximity to the historical trade corridors and physical characteristics of the
land, both of which directly a↵ect farmland value. To address this, I control for the
shortest distance to the walking trails in columns 2 and 3 and observed plot charac-
teristics in column 3. While many of these control variables have strong explanatory
power and sensible signs, the coe cient estimates of the distance to the line do not
change considerably in magnitude from previous estimates in column 1 and are statis-
tically significant at the 1 percent level. The results show that plots suitable for rice
and plots with year round as well as seasonal irrigation are more valuable. Likewise,
an increase in land gradient negatively a↵ects the value of the land; whereas, plots
that are closer to the district headquarter or to the foot trails have greater value.
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The coe cient estimates on the distance to the line in table 3.5 column 2 and 3
equal -0.039 and -0.042 respectively, both of which are within a standard error of the
estimate of -0.034 from column 1. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the instrumental
variable– distance to the line– is correlated with unobserved characteristics associated
with historical proximity to trade routes and with additional land quality variables
that are not captured in the present data set, thereby bolstering the validity of the
given instrument.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 column 3 present IV estimates of road accessibility by using
distance to the line as an instrument for the household’s travel time to the nearest
road. The estimates of the coe cient   from the 2SLS model are -0.234 and -0.263
for the two algorithms and they are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
The results suggest that an increase in the travel time to the nearest road by one
percent decreases the farmland value by about 0.25 percent. Table 3.9 shows the
results for the first stage of the 2SLS model by estimating coe cient  
0
in equation
(3.6), which suggest that an increase in the distance to the line by one percent raises
the household’s travel time to the nearest road by 0.17 percent. The F-statistics on
the excluded variable from both algorithms in the first stage are large, 24.58 and
20.53, which indicate that the IV estimates are unlikely to be biased due to weak
instrument. Moreover, the IV estimates are robust to di↵erent parameters of the
algorithm used to construct the instrument, suggesting that an improvement in rural
road infrastructure has a positive impact on households’ economic gains from their
agricultural activities.
3.7 Conclusion
Transportation infrastructure plays a crucial role in rural development. It im-
proves agricultural productivity by reducing transaction costs (Jacoby , 2000) and
promotes e cient labor allocation by stimulating commercialization of agriculture
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(Gollin and Rogerson, 2010). Since many poor reside in remote locations, it provides
a direct means of reaching them, thereby facilitating e↵ective delivery of poverty
programs and basic services in health, nutrition, and education. However, evaluating
transportation projects poses a considerable challenge because roads are not randomly
placed nor it is feasible to randomize by design.
I identify a unique geographic feature of mountains in rural Nepal that allows
for a plausibly exogenous variation in the placement of rural roads. The empirical
strategy is based on the fact that two important determinants of road construction,
administrative need to connect district headquarters and the geographic feature that
favors north-south linkages, are likely to be independent of the socio-economic charac-
teristics of households living in the hinterlands. Using the distance to the north-south
line that connect two district headquarters as an instrument for road accessibility, I
find that reduction in travel time to the nearest road increases farm profits, implying
a significant economic gains to rural agricultural households.
Although it establishes a causal link between economic benefits and infrastruc-
ture investments, the distributional consequences of such projects are unclear. While
remote households have most to gain from improved access, the agricultural profits
from farmland are confined to landowners who are usually not among the very poor.
Moreover, the mechanisms through which farm profits rise are also not identified.
The most likely candidates include a greater use of modern inputs such as chemical
fertilizers and improved seeds, an easier dissemination of new farm technologies, and
an improved access to urban centers with large demand for agricultural output. These
important channels could be identified by employing a similar empirical strategy in
the future. Moreover, the benefits from road construction are not only limited to
farm profits. Gollin and Rogerson (2010) find increase in non-agricultural employ-
ment and greater urbanization due to better road network. By promoting factor
mobility and improving access to schools, road construction could also raise expected
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returns to education, prompting households to invest more in human capital. The
empirical strategy could easily be extended to evaluate the e↵ect of road on a wider
set of economic outcomes of interest including household’s education, health, nutri-
tion, and migration decisions, which are important determinants of its welfare and
its community’s long term economic development.
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Figure 3.1: The Physical Map of Nepal
"/Users/sleshshrestha/Dropbox/University of Michigan/Research/Chapter 3-Roads/Figures/elevation nepal"-eps-converted-to.pdf
Notes: The figure illustrates the ruggedness of the terrain. While the thin southern
stretch of the country is flat and uniform, the land surface north of the Terrai plain
is characterized by sharp changes in elevation as illustrated by the compactness of
contour lines.
104
Figure 3.2: Historical Trade Routes and Walking Trails
"/Users/sleshshrestha/Dropbox/University of Michigan/Research/Chapter 3-Roads/Figures/Nepal roads, district border, district HQ"-eps-converted-to.pdf
Notes: The figure plots the walking trails that span the country. The district head-
quarters are illustrated by dotted points on the map. The foot trails stretch in a
north-south as well as an east-west directions.
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Figure 3.3: Lines Constructed by Connecting District Headquarters (Using 10 Blocks
Algorithm)
"/Users/sleshshrestha/Dropbox/University of Michigan/Research/Chapter 3-Roads/Figures/GRID10"-eps-converted-to.pdf
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Figure 3.4: Five Development Regions of Nepal
"/Users/sleshshrestha/Dropbox/University of Michigan/Research/Chapter 3-Roads/Figures/development region nepal"-eps-converted-to.pdf
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Figure 3.5: Lines Constructed by Connecting District Headquarters (Using 12 Blocks
Algorithm)
"/Users/sleshshrestha/Dropbox/University of Michigan/Research/Chapter 3-Roads/Figures/GRID12"-eps-converted-to.pdf
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Figure 3.6: Flow of Rivers and Streams
"/Users/sleshshrestha/Dropbox/University of Michigan/Research/Chapter 3-Roads/Figures/Nepal rivers, district borders, district HQ"-eps-converted-to.pdf
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Figure 3.7: Elevation
"/Users/sleshshrestha/Dropbox/University of Michigan/Research/Chapter 3-Roads/Figures/Nepal elevation, district borders, district HQ"-eps-converted-to.pdf
Notes: Blue indicate low elevation land and red indicates high elevation. The eleva-
tions changes drastically going from north to south, while the elevation remains fairly
constant going from east to west.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev
Panel A: HH Characteristics
Number of Households 2058 -
Land Area (Ha) 0.62 0.62
Number of Plots 3.30 2.19
Household Size 4.76 2.10
Travel Time to Paved Road (Hrs) 7.42 13.48
Panel B: Plot Characteristics
Number of Plots 6785 -
Plot Size (Ha.) 0.19 0.25
Plot Value (Million Rs. per Ha.) 3.04 17.47
% Suitable for Rice 30.79 46.17
% with Year Round Irrigation 14.62 35.33
% with Seasonal Irrigation 16.34 36.98
% with Tubewell 0.87 9.29
% with Canal 25.78 43.74
% with Pond 0.25 4.99
% with Mixed 0.29 5.42
Elevation (Meters) 1215.45 457.63
Land Gradient (Degrees) 24.29 11.35
Panel C: Distance Variables (in Km)
Distance to the Line (10 Blocks) 11.51 9.41
Distance to the Line (12 Blocks) 11.88 9.06
Distance to District Headquarters 15.95 8.82
Distance to EWH 51.75 21.18
Distance to River 0.84 0.59
Distance to Foot Trails 1.25 1.26
Notes: The household and plot samples are restricted to rural hill region. The household
and plot level data in Panels A and B (except elevation and land gradient) is obtained from
2011 Nepal Living Standard Survey. The rest of the data including distance variables are
calculated using MENRIS data.
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= 1 (p-value) 0.000 0.255 0.439
District Fixed E↵ect No No Yes
Number of Plots 327 327 327
Notes: This table reports the coe cient of the log of rent from equation (3.4), where the
dependent variable is the log of plot market value. If the asset-pricing model is valid and
market value of the plot is equal to the discounted future rent stream, then this coe cient
v
1
= 1. The table also presents the p-value of this test.
⌧ Log of plot area is the excluded instrument.
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level
** indicates significance at the 1 percent level
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Table 3.3: E↵ect of Road on Land Value (OLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Log Travel Time to Road -0.190*** -0.173*** -0.146***
(0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0060)

















Suitable for Rice 0.458*** 0.211***
(0.0520) (0.0462)
District Fixed E↵ect No No Yes
R Squared 0.301 0.361 0.530
Number of Plots 6750 6750 6750
*significance at the 10 percent level ** significance at the 5 percent level *** significance at the 1 percent level
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Table 3.4: Relation Between Travel Time to Road and Distance to the Line
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: 10 Blocks
Log Distance to the Line 0.623*** 0.603*** 0.205***
(0.0576) (0.0554) (0.0682)
Log Distance to District Headquarter 1.174***
(0.117)
Log Distance to EWH 0.724***
(0.184)
R Squared 0.055 0.431 0.463
Panel B: 12 Blocks
Log Distance to the Line 0.592*** 0.640*** 0.237***
(0.0601) (0.0574) (0.0719)
Log Distance to District Headquarter 1.145***
(0.1190)
Log Distance to EWH 0.754***
(0.1840)
R Squared 0.046 0.433 0.463
District Fixed E↵ect No Yes Yes
Number of HHs 2025 2025 2025
Notes:
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level
** indicates significance at the 1 percent level
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Table 3.5: E↵ect of Road on Land Value Using 10 Blocks (Reduced Form)
(1) (2) (3)
Log Distance to the Line -0.034* -0.039** -0.042**
(0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0187)





















Log Distance to River 0.007
(0.0138)
Log Distance to District Headquarter -0.338*** -0.335*** -0.255***
(0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0327)
Log Distance to Foot Trails -0.044*** -0.041***
(0.0116) (0.0111)




District Fixed E↵ect Yes Yes Yes
R Squared 0.457 0.458 0.511
Number of Plots 6745 6745 6745
*significance at the 10 percent level ** significance at the 5 percent level *** significance at the 1 percent level
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Table 3.6: E↵ect of Road on Land Value Using 12 Blocks (Reduced Form)
(1) (2) (3)
Log Distance to the Line -0.0502** -0.0489** -0.0449**
(0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0195)





















Log Distance to River 0.008
(0.0138)
Log Distance to District Headquarter -0.322*** -0.325*** -0.251***
(0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0333)
Log Distance to Foot Trails -0.042*** -0.039***
(0.0116) (0.0111)




District Fixed E↵ect Yes Yes Yes
R Squared 0.457 0.458 0.511
Number of Plots 6745 6745 6745
*significance at the 10 percent level ** significance at the 5 percent level *** significance at the 1 percent level
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Table 3.7: E↵ect of Road on Land Value Using 10 Blocks (IV)
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Reduced Form IV⌧
Log Travel Time to Road -0.130*** - -0.234**
(0.00627) (0.1050)
Log Distance to the Line - -0.042** -
(0.0187)
Log Plot Area 0.686*** 0.676*** 0.692***
(0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0152)
Irrigation:
Year-Round 0.684*** 0.622*** 0.724***
(0.0852) (0.0874) (0.0959)
Seasonal 0.305*** 0.258*** 0.334***
(0.0761) (0.0783) (0.0827)
Mode of Irrigation:
Tubewell 0.212 0.287* 0.169
(0.1560) (0.1590) (0.1640)
Canal -0.012 0.066 -0.064
(0.0725) (0.0744) (0.0903)
Pond 0.086 0.239 -0.028
(0.2620) (0.2700) (0.2900)
Mixed 0.459* 0.552** 0.380
(0.2610) (0.2690) (0.2770)
Plot Quality:
Suitable for Rice 0.176*** 0.200*** 0.159***
(0.0461) (0.0474) (0.0498)
Land Gradient -0.126*** -0.169*** -0.093**
(0.0164) (0.0168) (0.0374)
Log Distance to River 0.019 0.007 0.028*
(0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0165)
Log Distance to District Headquarter -0.178*** -0.255*** -0.084
(0.0264) (0.0327) (0.0991)
Log Distance to Foot Trails -0.032*** -0.041*** -0.024*
(0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0135)
Log Distance to EWH 0.361*** 0.298*** 0.395***
(0.0590) (0.0601) (0.0689)
Elevation -0.000 -0.000*** -0.005
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
F-Statistics on Instrument 24.58
Probability>F 0.000
⌧ Log Distance to the Line is the excluded instrument. All specifications include district fixed e↵ect.
*significance at the 10 percent level ** significance at the 5 percent level *** significance at the 1 percent level
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Table 3.8: E↵ect of Road on Land Value Using 12 Blocks (IV)
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Reduced Form IV⌧
Log Travel Time to Road -0.130*** - -0.263**
(0.00627) (0.1160)
Log Distance to the Line - -0.045** -
(0.0195)
Log Plot Area 0.686*** 0.677*** 0.694***
(0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0156)
Irrigation:
Year-Round 0.684*** 0.624*** 0.736***
(0.0852) (0.0873) (0.0989)
Seasonal 0.305*** 0.263*** 0.342***
(0.0761) (0.0783) (0.0848)
Mode of Irrigation:
Tubewell 0.212 0.281* 0.157
(0.1560) (0.1590) (0.1670)
Canal -0.012 0.0649 -0.0779
(0.0725) (0.0744) (0.0944)
Pond 0.086 0.244 -0.0591
(0.2620) (0.2700) (0.2980)
Mixed 0.459* 0.558** 0.358
(0.2610) (0.2690) (0.2830)
Plot Quality:
Suitable for Rice 0.176*** 0.197*** 0.154***
(0.0461) (0.0474) (0.0510)
Land Gradient -0.126*** -0.167*** -0.084**
(0.0164) (0.0168) (0.0408)
Log Distance to River 0.019 0.00842 0.031*
(0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0173)
Log Distance to District Headquarter -0.178*** -0.251*** -0.058
(0.0264) (0.0333) (0.1090)
Log Distance to Foot Trails -0.032*** -0.039*** -0.022
(0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0141)
Log Distance to EWH 0.361*** 0.295*** 0.404***
(0.0590) (0.0601) (0.0713)
Elevation -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
F-Statistics on Instrument 20.53
Probability>F 0.000
⌧ Log Distance to the Line is the excluded instrument. All specifications include district fixed e↵ects.
*significance at the 10 percent level ** significance at the 5 percent level *** significance at the 1 percent level
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Table 3.9: Travel Time to Road and Distance to the Line (First Stage)
(1) (2)
10 Blocks 12 Blocks
Log Distance to the Line 0.176*** 0.167***
(0.0355) (0.0370)

















Suitable for Rice -0.162* -0.153*
(0.0898) (0.0899)
Land Gradient 0.323*** 0.314***
(0.0318) (0.0318)
Log Distance to River 0.090*** 0.086***
(0.0261) (0.0261)
Log Distance to District HQ 0.730*** 0.736***
(0.0618) (0.0631)
Log Distance to Foot Trails 0.081*** 0.072***
(0.0211) (0.0211)




District Fixed E↵ect Yes Yes
R Squared 0.445 0.445
Number of Plots 6710 6710
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
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